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Abstract 
In 2005, benefit sanctions in Germany were tightened with the introduction of the 
new means-tested unemployment benefit II (UB II), codified in Social Code (SC) II. 
This study analyzes the effect of benefit sanctions on the reservation wage of sanc-
tioned unemployment benefit II recipients. The behavioral effect of a benefit sanction 
is an empirically open question. According to job search theory, benefit sanctions 
directly reduce reservation wages. To explore this hypothesis, propensity score 
matching is adopted. The dataset used is a unique survey of UB II recipients in the 
first year of SC II. For the identification of the effect, the study relies on the rich indi-
vidual data and the rather unsystematic sanctioning process in the starting months 
after the introduction of the SC II. The timing of the sanction is explicitly considered 
by estimating the effects for the first four quarters of UB II receipt in 2005. The main 
result is that there was no significant effect of sanctions on the reservation wages of 
sanctioned unemployment benefit II recipients. A side result is that sanctioned UB II 
recipients were not more likely to be employed at the time of their interview either. 
Both results are robust to various matching estimators, estimation specifications and 
to the timing of the UB II sanction. 
 
JEL classification: J64, J68, C13 
 
Keywords: Job search, unemployment insurance, benefit sanction, reservation 
wages 
 
 
 
 
I would especially like to thank Viktor Steiner and Joachim Wolff, further Sarah Bern-
hard, Marco Caliendo, Miriam Beblo and the participants of the IAB/WiSo graduate 
program and the BeNA seminary for their very helpful comments. Financial support 
from the IAB is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 19/2008 5 
1 Introduction 
It is an open question how and to what amount benefit sanctions change the behav-
ior of benefit recipients. I want to contribute to the ongoing debate on the effective-
ness of benefit sanctions by estimating the effect of Germany’s new unemployment 
benefit II sanctions on the reservation wages of sanctioned benefit recipients in the 
year 2005. Several studies on optimal unemployment insurance indicate that a strict 
benefit sanction policy would be more efficient than lower benefits to enhance com-
pliance with the eligibility requirements of unemployment insurance (see e.g. Boone 
et al. 2007, Kluve 2006). Enhanced compliance with eligibility requirements, such as 
greater readiness to search and accept jobs, would lead to a reduction in unem-
ployment. 
In fact, many OECD countries, concerned about their unemployment rates, tight-
ened unemployment benefit sanctions (see e.g. Grubb 2000, Boone and Van Ours 
2000, Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005, Nickell 2003, OECD 2007). So did Germany, 
most notably with its recent labor market reform “Hartz IV”. The labor market reform 
was codified in the new Social Code II, which came into force January 2005, and 
has as its core the basic social security for needy job-seekers called unemployment 
benefit II (UB II). UB II recipients can receive severe sanctions for various reasons, 
above all for not showing enough job search effort, for refusing an appropriate job 
offer or integration measure and for not meeting appointments with case managers 
in the employment office or medical or psychological appointments (see Statistik der 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2007). The eligibility requirements and sanction intensities 
for UB II recipients were tightened even further in June 2006 and in January 2007.  
There are a couple of empirical studies on the effects of benefit sanctions for Euro-
pean neighbor countries but not for Germany (Van den Berg et al. 2004, Abbring et 
al. 2005, Lalive et al. 2005, Svarer 2007). These studies mostly focus on the effect 
of unemployment insurance benefit (UI) sanctions on the exit rates out of benefit 
receipt. In line with theoretical expectations, results indicate that both warnings be-
fore sanctions and imposed sanctions make benefit recipients exit benefit receipt 
faster. But why sanctions elevate benefit exit rates – this question remains unre-
solved. Are the observed elevated exit rates out of benefit receipt after a sanction 
due to a) more job search, b) more effective job search or c) lower reservation 
wages of the unemployed benefit recipients?  
This study wants to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of 
benefit sanctions by explicitly exploring the hypothesis of job search theory that 
benefit sanctions directly reduce reservation wages, and by focusing on the German 
unemployment benefit system. Contrary to most empirical research on sanctions, I 
regard German unemployment benefit II sanctions, internationally more comparable 
to social assistance sanctions than to UI sanctions. The data I use is a cross-section 
survey of unemployment benefit II recipients with rich and unique information on the 
first fifteen months after the new Social Code II was implemented, called “Life situa-
tion and social security 2005”. For the identification of the effect of sanctions on res-
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ervation wages, I adopt a propensity score matching as selection on observables 
approach, relying on my informative data and the observation of a rather unsystem-
atic sanctioning process in the first year of the new Social Code II. I explicitly con-
sider the timing of the sanction in my design and estimate the effects for four subse-
quent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt in 2005.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section two, I explain the 
details of the UB II sanctions under evaluation. In Section three, I consider the theo-
retical relationship between sanctions and reservation wages, and look what previ-
ous empirical research can teach us about it. In Section four, I describe the survey 
and the selection of the sample, with special emphasis on sanctions and reservation 
wages. In Section five, I explain the methodology I use. In Section six, I present my 
estimation results. Finally, Section seven summarizes and offers my conclusions.  
2 Sanctions in Germany’s new means-tested unemployment 
benefit system 
With the establishment of the new Social Code (SC) II, the German government 
facilitated and intensified the use of sanctions in the unemployment benefit system. 
The SC II regulates the basic income for needy job-seekers (alias unemployment 
benefit II or UB II), and was installed on January 1, 2005 through a labor market 
reform colloquially referred to as “Hartz IV”.1 “Hartz IV” merged former unemploy-
ment assistance (UA) and social assistance to means-tested UB II.2 Since the level 
of UB II payments is equivalent to the socio-cultural poverty level, “Hartz IV” reduced 
average net replacement rates for long-term benefit recipients.3  
                                                
1  The law “Hartz IV” (“Viertes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt”) was 
passed on December 23, 2003 and is the last of four labor market reforms that rooted in 
the recommendations of a policy commission in 2002: the “Hartz-Kommission” (named af-
ter its chairman Peter Hartz). A comprehensive description of the “Hartz”-reforms offer 
Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2006). 
2  Previously, the entitled unemployed received UI benefits for up to 32 months at a rate of 
60 to 67 percent of prior net salary, followed by means-tested UA benefits of 53 to 57 
percent of prior net salary for an unlimited period. From January 1, 2005 on, UI benefits 
(called unemployment benefit I or UB I now) are followed by UB II benefits (besides, from 
January 1, 2006 on, UI benefits are only paid for up to 18 months, regulated by “Gesetz 
zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt”, passed on December 24, 2004). 
3  The OECD measured the effect of the “Hartz IV” reform in Germany by comparing the 
average net replacement rates for long-term benefit recipients in 2001 and 2005 (OECD 
2007: p.173). Net replacement rates fell for all family types the OECD considered in the 
report: Single, one-earner and two-earner households with no, one or two children. Bene-
fit reductions were generally larger for those who had higher earnings – reflecting the 
move from a benefit calculated as a percentage of previous earnings to UB II. The reduc-
tions were also generally smaller in households with children – families with children re-
ceived somewhat favourable treatment compared to childless families. A typical long-term 
unemployed person received around 150 Euro less benefits per month. The simulations 
of Blos and Rudolph (2005) that indicated 2/5 of former UA recipients would receive in-
creased benefit levels after the reform were based on 2003 data and could only consider 
former UA recipients.  
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The responsible bodies for the implementation of Social Code II are the Federal 
Employment Agency and the municipalities. According to the “one-stop-shop” prin-
ciple, UB II recipients have only one contact point called “Job Center”, where the 
local employment office and the municipality usually work as a team (as “Arbeitsge-
meinschaft”, ARGE) and each UB II recipient is attended by her personal case man-
ager. During the implementation until 2008, there are 69 test-districts where, as an 
alternative, “opting municipalities” run the Job Center by themselves.  
In January 2005, around 6.3 million people were immediately affected by the reform 
(for these and the following numbers see Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
2005 and Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2007). Around 3.3 million need communities 
consisting of 6.1 million people received benefits according to SC II; 4.5 million peo-
ple received UB II and 1.6 million “Sozialgeld”. Approximately 1.7 million UB II re-
cipients were former able-to-work social assistance recipients (around nine of ten 
social assistance recipients of December 2004), 1.8 million former recipients of un-
employment assistance (around nine of ten UA recipients of December 2004), and 
the final million consisted of relatives of former UA recipients and people who did not 
receive benefits before. Around 0.2 million former UA recipients ceased to receive 
benefits between December 2004 and January 2005.4 
Basically, every person is entitled to UB II, who is able-to-work (defined as being 
able to work at least three hours a day), who is between 15 and 64 years of age, 
who generally lives in Germany and who is not fully able to cover her basic needs 
and the needs of her “need unit” (“Bedarfsgemeinschaft”)5. UB II payments involve 
the base benefit, housing and heating allowances, and social security contributions - 
as far and as long the measures of active labor market policy have not enabled the 
unemployment benefit II recipient to cover the basic needs by herself. In the year 
2005, the base benefit was 345 Euro in Western Germany and 331 Euro in Eastern 
Germany.6 
The benefit is lower if the benefit recipient is member of a need unit: Adult partners 
receive 90 percent, children between 14 and 25 years 80 percent and children under 
                                                
4  The lack of more exact numbers is due to a change of the labor market statistics evoked 
by the implementation of the new SC II. Until end of 2004, labor market statistics were 
solely based on administrative data stemming from the software used in the employment 
offices (see Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2005). In 2005, the data stem from dif-
ferent software products used in the employment offices, in the ARGEs and in the opting 
municipalities. 
5  In the year 2005, a need unit consisted in practice of the able-to-work, needy person, her 
partner and her children (including single, able-to-work children below 18 years; now be-
low 25 years). If a needy person is younger than 15, older than 64 years or not perma-
nently able-to-work and member of a need unit, she is entitled to a benefit called “Sozial-
geld” (§ 28 SC II). 
6  From July 1, 2006 on, the base benefit is the same in East and West Germany. It is ad-
justed annually on July 1, in line with the current pension value of the statutory pension 
insurance system (§ 30,4 SC II). At the moment (until July 1, 2008), it is 347 Euro per 
month. 
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14 years 60 percent. Since UB II is a means-tested benefit, UB II recipients have to 
be needy but not necessarily unemployed. In contrast to the former unemployment 
assistance, eligibility for UB II does not depend on former contributions to unem-
ployment insurance. The base UB II, however, is higher for former UI benefit recipi-
ents, because in the two years after moving from UI benefit to UB II a declining bo-
nus is paid.7 Additional needs allowances for extra expenses not covered by the 
standard benefit are paid for expectant mothers from the 13th week of pregnancy, 
for single parents depending on the age and number of children, for persons with 
disabilities and for expensive nutrition if demonstrably required for medical reasons.  
Apart from receiving passive benefits, UB II recipients can be assigned to measures 
of active labor market policy (ALMP). ALMP measures aim to improve the chances 
for their successful reintegration into the regular labor market (and are therefore 
called integration measures – “Eingliederungsmaßnahmen” – in SC II). The avail-
able integration measures in SC II are employment services and so-called psycho-
social services.8 Employment services are largely identical to those for UI benefit 
recipients and involve counseling, job placement services, allowances for applica-
tions and travel costs and employment and training measures (including employ-
ment-creating measures, bridging allowances and allowances for start-ups, subject 
to § 16 SC II). Psycho-social services are allowances for child care or care for rela-
tives, debt counseling, psycho-social counseling and addiction counseling.  
The heart of the integration measures is an individual counseling of the UB II recipi-
ent by a personal case manager who concludes an integration contract (“Einglie-
derungsvereinbarung”) with the benefit recipient. The integration contract has to be 
signed by both parties, and regulates job search activities, verification of such activi-
ties, and all benefit payments and integration measures the benefit recipient is enti-
tled to. This contract is to be renewed every six months. Since UB II recipients have 
neither right nor duty to receive a specific integration measure, to a large extent, it is 
the case manager who decides what type of integration measures he regards as 
suitable for the UB II recipient and offers her. Thus, case managers have a large 
amount of freedom of choice in the determination of integration contracts and the 
decision of suitable integration measures compared to UB II recipients. 
Besides integration measures, the SC II makes use of strict sanctions as instru-
ments of active labor market policy. If UB II recipients do not comply with certain 
requirements that should fasten their reintegration in the labor market, they can re-
ceive a sanction in form of a cut of benefits. Beforehand, they have to be legally 
                                                
7  The bonus is two thirds of the difference between UB I including housing allowance and 
UB II with an upper limit of 160 Euro for singles and 360 Euro for couples; each child 
raises the limit by 60 Euro. After one year, the bonus is cut in half.  
8  The Federal Employment Agency is responsible for the basic benefit of UB II and the 
integration measures. The municipality is responsible for housing and heating costs and 
psycho-social services. 
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informed about the possibilities of sanctions by the Job Center. Benefit sanctions in 
SC II can be applied for more reasons than UI benefit sanctions (“Sperrzeiten”) and 
than former benefit sanctions in social assistance.9 The following paragraphs de-
scribe the regulation for UB II sanctions during my observation period (and valid until 
25 July 2006 when sanctions were further tightened; for details see Bruhn Tripp and 
Tripp 2007). 
UB II recipients can receive sanctions for various reasons. Sanctions can be im-
posed if a UB II recipient refuses to accept an offered integration measure (including 
work measures as One-Euro-Jobs) or appropriate job offer. Appropriate is basically 
every job offer, including every type of job and the form of employment (minor, part- 
or full-time-employment, self-employment or employment subject to social insurance 
contributions). Sanctions can also be imposed if the UB II recipient provokes a drop 
out of such an appropriate job or an integration measure. Sanctions can be imposed 
if the UB II recipients refuses to sign an integration contract or fails to meet duties of 
her integration contract (especially do not show sufficient self-effort in job search). 
Furthermore, sanctions can be imposed if a benefit recipient intentionally reduces 
his income or assets in order to be entitled to UB II, incorrectly states his earnings or 
assets to the Job Center, or keeps on spending money in an uneconomical way (for 
example by spending too much money on telephone bills or repeatedly not paying 
rent bills). Sanctions can also be imposed if the UB II recipient fails to report to the 
Job Center (“Meldeversäumnis”) or fails to meet a medical or psychological ap-
pointment (“Terminversäumnis”). Finally, if a needy UI recipient (who is entitled to 
supplementary UB II receipt) temporarily stops to receive UI benefits due to an UI 
sanction (“Sperrzeit”), he receives an UB II sanction, too.  
The following Table 1 lists the possible non-compliances and the respective sanc-
tion according to § 31 SC II for the year 2005 for benefit recipients between 25 and 
57 years. 
                                                
9  In 2005, a first UI benefit sanction (“Sperrzeit”) according to § 144 SC III cut UI benefits 
for three, six or 12 weeks, depending on the justification for the sanction. Justifications for 
UI sanctions were refusal or quit of appropriate job offers or integration measures, lack of 
sufficient self-effort in the job search or failure to report to the employment office. More 
details on SC III sanctions offer Müller and Oschmiansky 2006 or WZB and infas 2005; 
Münder 2006 describes former benefit sanctions in social assistance (regulated in 
BSHG). 
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Table 1 
Sanction intensities according to type and frequency of non-compliance for UB II  
recipients between 25 and 57 years in 2005 
 Cut of base benefit for first time 
Cut of base benefit 
for repeated time 
(within prior sanc-
tion period) 
1. Refusal of appropriate job offer (including vocational training) or 
integration measure (including work measures) 
2. (Provoke) Drop out of appropriate job offer (including vocational 
training) or integration measure (including work measures) 
3. Refusal of signing integration contract 
4. Failure to meet duties of integration contract, especially do not 
show sufficient self effort in finding a job 
5. Intentional reduction of or misinformation on earnings and as-
sets 
6. UI benefit sanction 
7. Spending money in an uneconomical way 
30 % + 30 percentage points 
8. Failure to report to the Job Center (“Meldeversäumnis”) 
9. Failure to meet medical or psychological appointment  
(“Terminversäumnis”) 
10 % + 10 percentage points 
Notes: Own Table. Every sanction takes three months. The benefit cut is computed as a percentage of the base 
benefit. Moreover, the temporary two-year bonus for ex-recipients of unemployment insurance is addi-
tionally abolished during a sanction period. 
 
Most non-compliances lead to sanctions that cut the monthly base benefit (without 
allowances for accommodation and heating) by 30 percent for three months. For the 
example of a West German single, this reduced the base benefit of 345 Euro to 242 
Euro per month. Exceptions are sanctions for the failure to report to the Job Center 
or to meet appointments (“Melde- und Terminversäumnis”). These failures can re-
duce the base benefit by ten percent (reduction to 311 Euro per month in the exam-
ple). Benefits are cut for three months, even if the requirements are met in the 
meantime. Moreover, each sanction abolishes additionally the temporary two-year 
bonus for ex-recipients of unemployment insurance for the time of the sanction.  
If during the sanction period the sanctioned UB II recipient repeatedly non-complies, 
the base UB II benefit is supposed to be cut by another 30 percentage points (ten 
percentage points if the obligation to report is not met), and so on, up to a 100 per-
cent reduction. For the example of a West German single, a second sanction would 
reduce his base UB II benefit to 138 Euro per month. In the case of a 100 percent 
reduction, payments for additional needs, accommodation and heating can be af-
fected. If the base benefit is curtailed by more than 30 percent, in-kind transfers can 
be granted.  
The intensity of sanctions is higher for people younger than 25 years and older than 
57 years. Young UB II recipients from 16 to 24 years of age can receive a 100 per-
cent cut of the base benefit already for the first non-compliance (with allowances for 
housing and heating paid directly to the landlords). Older UB II recipients who turned 
58 years before January 1, 2008 are allowed to effectively retreat from the labor 
market, while receiving UB II without the risk of being sanctioned if they commit 
themselves to apply for a regular pension as soon as possible.  
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The precondition for sanctions is that the non-compliant benefit recipient herself 
does not prove to the case manager “important reasons” for her behavior. For the 
failure to refuse an appropriate job or labor market measure, the jurisdiction ac-
cepted reasons leading to personal incapability to do the offered work (a compre-
hensive overview offers Münder 2005). Accepted reasons for such incapability are 
temporary non-employability due to illness, having children of one’s own or of one’s 
partner in the household (parental leave, children under three years, children under 
16 years without child care, more than three children in school age), caring for rela-
tives (when there is no other possibility) or special disabilities. Other accepted im-
portant reasons are reasons of conscience of belief and lack of compatibility with 
one’s partnership. Integration measures can be refused if they clearly underchal-
lenge the benefit recipient.  
In sum, the new Social Code II thoroughly changed the structure of Germany’s so-
cial benefit system, to a considerable extent using benefit sanctions as instruments 
of active labor market policy. This change affects a large part of the needy popula-
tion in Germany. The benefit sanctions can be imposed for various non-
compliances, including showing not enough effort and accepting not every appropri-
ate job offer or integration measure. It is the non-compliant UB II recipient who has 
to prove important reasons to avoid a sanction. Sanctions cut the base benefit of UB 
II for three months by 30 percent for most non-compliances of UB II recipients. 
3 Theoretical considerations and previous empirical results 
In order to capture the effect of unemployment benefit sanctions on employment, job 
search literature was enriched with results of the literature of law enforcement and 
normative optimal insurance theory (a survey is offered by Fredriksson and Holm-
lund 2006). To facilitate deriving my hypotheses of the theoretical relationship be-
tween benefit sanctions and reservation wages, I will shortly introduce the partial job 
search model with sanctions of Abbring et al. (2005). It allows for a certain degree of 
arbitrariness when a case manager imposes a sanction. This assumption seems to 
apply for the sanctioning behavior of the Job Centers 1) in general, given c.p. vary-
ing sanction rates between and within employment offices (see Müller 2007 for 
Germany, and Lalive et al. 2005 for Switzerland) and 2) especially in the first year 
after the new SC II came into force (see the Section Methodology for details). 
In the model of Abbring et al. (2005), the optimal strategy of an unemployed insur-
ance benefit recipient consists of choosing both her optimal reservation wage r (the 
lowest remuneration he will accept) and her intensity of the job search s. The more 
intense the job search is, the higher the search costs c and the more job offers λ 
arrive. To allow for arbitrariness in the application of a benefit sanction, the following 
assumption is made: The benefit recipient neither exactly knows the rules that she 
has to comply with, nor the type of behavior that will generate a sanction, nor when 
it will be imposed. But she knows that beyond a certain search intensity no sanction 
will be imposed. Hence, there is a positive probability of receiving a sanction for 
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those benefit recipients whose optimal search intensity s1 is ex-ante below a mini-
mum threshold s*.  
The optimal reservation wage r is implicitly defined by (i) the flow of benefits net of 
search costs and (ii) the job offer arrival rate times the expected gain of finding a job 
over receiving UI, as usual, and (iii) the rate at which a benefit sanction arrives times 
the expected loss of a sanction compared to no sanction. In formal terms: 
)](*)()()()())([(max 1201111111
1
1
RRpssIwdFRwsscbRr
r
s
−<+−+−== ∫+∞ ρλρ   (T1) 
with ρ being the discount rate, R1 the present value of future income and F(w) the 
cumulative distribution function of all possible wages. I(s1<s*) is an indicator func-
tion, equal to 1 if the search intensity s1 is less than the threshold s*, and associated 
with p0, the non-zero rate that a sanction is imposed. The optimal value of job 
search intensity s1 is reached by differentiating relation T1 with respect to s1. Benefit 
recipients for which it is optimal to search more intensively than the minimum 
threshold (if s1>s*) are not affected by a non-zero sanction probability. For others, 
their reservation wage r1 should fall and in turn search intensity s1 rises, but which of 
the two changes more, is not explicit. 
After a sanction, the unemployment benefits of those benefit recipients with a sanc-
tion are reduced permanently (b1>b2). This lets their reservation wages r2 fall and 
raises their search intensity s2 at a value higher than the threshold level s*. This is 
assumed to happen because they want to avoid at all cost additional sanctioning 
leading to further benefit reduction. In formal terms (R2 is the present value of future 
income after a sanction): 
)]()()())([(max 2222*|22
2
22
wdFRwsscbRr
r
sss
−+−== ∫+∞≥ ρλρ      (T2) 
A more realistic assumption of sanctions that lead to temporary, not permanent 
benefit reductions do not alter the direction of the effect, but the degree: the reserva-
tion wage simply decreases to a smaller degree. Both the decrease in reservation 
wages as the increased search intensity contribute to higher exit rates to employ-
ment, but again it is unclear whether the reservation wage or the search intensity 
changes more.10 
                                                
10  Note that this is only one way of modeling such sanction effects; e.g. Van den Berg et al. 
(2004) suggest that benefit recipients could have an imprecise idea of the necessary 
amount of search intensity to avoid a sanction. After getting a sanction they may adjust 
their idea of the threshold value in search intensity, and may as a result maintain a higher 
search effort after the expiration of the sanction. Furthermore, because the additional 
search effort generates extra search costs, being unemployed is less preferable after a 
sanction leading reduced reservation wages. Another explanation is that monitoring is 
typically tightened after a violation of the requirements. This leads to higher search inten-
sity and therefore higher search costs, too. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 19/2008 13 
In sum, based on these theoretical considerations I derive the following hypotheses: 
Benefit sanctions reduce reservation wages. The probability to receive a sanction 
depends on the search intensity and the reservation wage of the unemployed bene-
fit recipient. If the search intensity is too low or the reservation wage to high, a sanc-
tion will be imposed with a nonzero probability. Both search intensity and reservation 
wage are influenced by individual characteristics of the benefit recipient (motivation, 
ability, risk-aversion), search costs, by the frequency and quality of arriving job of-
fers and by the attractiveness of staying unemployed (including the level of UI bene-
fit, the benefit cut by a sanction and the probability to get sanctioned according to 
one’s effort).  
Empirical literature on benefit sanctions and reservation wages 
In the following subsection, previous empirical results on three research topics are 
presented: effects of benefit sanctions, reservation wages and selection into benefit 
sanctions.  
There is a small number of recent empirical studies on the effects of UI sanctions on 
exit rates of benefit recipients in European labor markets, one for the Netherlands 
(the mentioned study of Abbring et al. 2005 where the model stems from), one for 
Switzerland (Lalive et al. 2005) and one for Denmark (Svarer 2007). One study ana-
lyzes the effects of social assistance sanctions on exit rates of Dutch benefit recipi-
ents (Van den Berg et al. 2004).11 All used the timing-of-event approach on non-
experimental data and found significant effects of benefit sanctions on exit rates out 
of benefit receipt, presumably beyond the sanction period, and rather homogenous 
across the population (though gender effects might exist). The ex-ante effect might 
be stronger than the ex-post effect in raising exit rates.  
We saw that in theory, exit rates from unemployment increase with higher search 
intensity and lower reservation wages. If one wants to apply the results of the stud-
ies for the prediction of the impact of a sanction on the reservation wage, the prob-
                                                
11  Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2004) and Svarer (2007) study exit rates out of unem-
ployment benefit receipt, Van den Berg et al. (2004) study exit rates to employment. Ab-
bring et al. (2005) found out that exit rates of sanctioned benefit recipients increased by 
between 36 percent and 98 percent compared to non-sanctioned benefit recipients. This 
effect was stable across time and population. Lalive et al. (2004) could distinguish in their 
data the different impacts of warnings and real sanctions on exit rates out of unemploy-
ment. Warnings increased the exit rate by 25 percent, sanctions by 20 percent. The ef-
fects did not differ over the population, but the warning effect fell to 16 percent after one 
month; the ex-post effect did not significantly differ over time. Svarer (2007) found het-
erogeneous effects by gender: For males he noted significant evidence of ex-ante effects 
because the association between the risk of being sanctioned and the exit rate out of UI 
receipt was positive. After being sanctioned, exit rates increased by 98 percent for 
women and by 55 percent for men. Regarding social assistance recipients, Van den Berg 
et al. (2004) present similar results for the ex-post effect of a sanction. The exit rate to 
employment increased by more than 140 percent after a two-week reduction in benefits 
was imposed. Furthermore, they found that the effect persisted beyond the sanction pe-
riod. A harder sanction did not result in stronger effects. They did not find different im-
pacts across the population. 
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lem is that the studies could not distinguish the impact of sanctions from the impact 
of a higher level of job search assistance probably coming along with the imposition 
of a sanction. Sanctions might elevate exit rates out of UI benefit or social assis-
tance receipt just by raising the job search intensity in giving more attention or more 
effective search tips to benefit recipients (Gorter and Kalb 1996, Dolton and O’Neill 
1996). Ashenfelter et al. (2005) eliminate this obstacle with the help of a social ex-
periment carried out in four states of the US that incorporated only the element of 
work search verification with sanctions without corresponding job search assistance. 
They found that work search verification had no significant impact on exit rates out 
of benefit receipt.12 
To my knowledge, there is no study on the effects of benefit sanctions on the reser-
vation wage. There are, however, numerous estimations of the elasticity of reserva-
tion wages with respect to the income of unemployed persons based on surveys. As 
from my theoretical considerations to be expected, the elasticity is found to be posi-
tive; its magnitude, however, is slight.13 As a consequence, the probability of accept-
ing a job offer proves in the majority of cases to be between 0.9 and 1, suggesting 
that the reservation wage lies very close to the lower bound of the distribution of 
wages existing in the economy (see Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004: 157p.).  
Previous empirical analyses of reservation wages in Germany are mostly based on 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) which contains self-reported monthly 
net reservation wages. For the GSOEP one has to keep in mind that it has relatively 
few cases in the low-income segment. The results suggest that personal character-
istics of the unemployed are the most important determinants for reservation wages 
in the dataset (especially most recent wages, e.g. Prasad 2003, Christensen 2005, 
Falk et al. 2006). 
Christensen does not find an impact of different kinds of unemployment benefits on 
reservation wages. Prasad finds a small positive impact of the levels of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits on reservation wages. Pannenberg (2007) finds that the 
                                                
12  Job seekers were randomly separated in three groups, one control group and two treat-
ment groups. The control group was faced with the usual conditions of eligibility for UI 
benefit. The two treatment groups were at their first visit notified of additional compulsory 
job search requirements. At their second visit, the two treatment groups were treated dif-
ferently. For one, job search requirements were monitored, while this was not done for 
those in the other treatment group. The job-seekers who could not prove that they con-
tacted an employer received a sanction. Ashenfelter et al. (2005) found that the rates of 
exit from unemployment for the individuals in the two treatment groups were not statisti-
cally different. 
13  Devine and Kiefer (1991) give examples of the scope of estimated elasticities: Lynch’s 
(1983) average estimates lie between 0.08 and 0.11 for youths in the UK, Holzer’s (1986) 
average estimates for youths in the U.S. are smaller with 0.02 to 0.05, like Van den 
Berg’s (1990) estimates for reservation wage elasticity at the onset of a period of unem-
ployment in relation to the future income of 30 to 55 year old unemployed in the Nether-
lands of 0.04 to 0.09. Other estimations, e.g. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Fishe 
(1982), were markedly higher though (0.4 for the 70s in the US). 
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elasticity of reservation wages regarding unemployment benefits is significantly posi-
tive, but only for risk-loving job-seekers: for them, a ten percent cut in the benefit 
level leads to a four percent decrease in reservation wages.  
Bender et al. (2007) are the first to analyze hourly reservation wages of unemploy-
ment benefit II recipients, based on the same dataset but another sample used here; 
they consider unemployment benefit II recipients who explicitly search a job at the 
time of the interview. They confirm previous findings of the great predictive power of 
personal characteristics and especially last net wages for reservation wages. They 
could not estimate the income elasticity of reservation wages; UB II recipients, how-
ever, who had received (presumably higher) UI benefit receipt still during 2005 had 
no significantly higher reservation wages when last net wages were taken into ac-
count.  
If unemployment income elasticity of reservation wages is similarly small in my 
sample, sanctions might have no or very limited ex-post effects on reservation 
wages of risk-averse benefit recipients. From a theoretical perspective, the ex-ante 
effect of a sanction should be larger for risk-averse than for risk-loving benefit re-
cipients. This means they reduce their reservation wages already before a possible 
sanction to their lowest possible level that they cannot underbid even in case they 
receive a sanction.  
In sum, previous empirical research indicates that 1) benefit sanctions do raise exit 
rates out of benefit receipt, maybe ex-ante even more than ex-post, 2) perhaps 
more via increased job search intensity than reduced reservation wages, because 3) 
sanctions alone might not raise exit rates and 4) reservation wages seem to be al-
ready at the lower bound of the wage distribution. 5) Principally, German reservation 
wages appear to be influenced by one’s labor market position, reflected mainly in 
last net wages, and only slightly by unemployment income; this elasticity might be 
influenced by one’s degree of risk aversion. 
For my methodological approach, I need to understand the selection into treatment 
and know all variables that influence both sanctions and reservation wages. Above 
(see Section Theoretical considerations) I derived the hypothesis that both the sanc-
tion probability and the reservation wage seem to be influenced by individual char-
acteristics of the benefit recipient (motivation, ability, risk-aversion), search costs, by 
the frequency and quality of arriving job offers and by the attractiveness of staying 
unemployed (including the level of UI benefit, the benefit cut by a sanction and the 
probability to get sanctioned according to one’s effort).  
Detailed information on the individual’s labor market position and household context 
should be strongly related to unobservable factors related to the individual’s motiva-
tion, social skills and risk aversion: A more motivated person, for example, will en-
gage more in education and qualification and will try harder to get and keep a good 
(paid) job, while it is likewise likely that responsibility for other persons increases 
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one’s motivation and risk aversion.14 To my knowledge, Müller (2007) is the only 
study that explicitly models determinants of the sanction risk of unemployment in-
surance recipients in Germany. His results indicate that younger people with lower 
benefit levels (who might be less risk-averse) and with previous sanctions (proxying 
maybe less motivation to search or a higher reservation wage) receive more sanc-
tions.  
Sociological research on sanctions in US-American TANF (“Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families”) introduced the concept of employment barriers into the analysis 
of sanction mechanisms; in the search theoretical framework, these people would 
face higher search costs (and infinite search costs would impede search). Results 
indicate that sanctioned benefit recipients suffer from more structural problems on 
the labor market than non-sanctioned benefit recipients, and that their probability to 
receive benefits is higher (Meyers et al. 2006). Personal characteristics (analphabet-
ism for example) or statistical discrimination (because of belonging to a certain 
group) might cause these structural problems of sanctioned benefit recipients on the 
labor market. As an undesired side effect, benefit sanctions could further deteriorate 
these lower chances while partly or totally failing to induce the desired behavioral 
changes.  
Taking the duration of TANF receipt into account, lower qualification, no or little work 
experience, more or younger children, being Afro-American and the duration of 
benefit receipt proof to robustly increase the probability to receive a TANF sanc-
tion.15 Further structural problems (like lack of physical or mental health, disabilities, 
care for children or relatives, domestic violence, transportation or technical commu-
nication problems or addictions) were not always of significant impact.  
Studies on the process of sanctioning in both the US-American TANF as well as in 
German unemployment insurance found out that beside the UI recipients character-
istics the individuals who implement the sanctions and the environment they take 
their decisions in influence the individual risk of being sanctioned (see Meyers et al. 
2006, Müller and Oschmiansky 2006, Müller 2007). First, the regional regular and 
irregular labor market seem to play a role: the more jobs or ALMP measures the 
benefit recipient is offered, the more he can possibly reject or quit, thus not comply-
ing with eligibility criteria and provoking a sanction.  
                                                
14  Among the few studies trying to measure the role of risk attitudes in labor market choices, 
DeLeire and Levy (2004) suggest family structure as a proxy for risk preferences. They 
show that primary caregivers tend to work in occupations with lower risk of death.  
15
  The majority of the studies described in Meyers et al. (2006) do not consider hazard rates 
(i.e. sanction rates in specific duration intervals of benefit receipt) but the overall sanction 
probability of a person receiving TANF. Taking the duration of benefit receipt into account 
is important because lower chances on the labor market will most probably lead to longer 
benefit receipt, and longer benefit receipt leads to a higher sanction probability (see also 
the Section Methodology). 
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Second, employment offices seem to have milder or stricter sanction ‘philosophies’ 
leading to different sanction rates. Third, individual case manager’s values, attitudes 
towards sanctioning, and workloads seem to affect the sanction probability. Front-
line workers might impose a sanction only when they feel that “it’s going to pay off”. 
Thus, benefit recipients with lower labor market chances may be spared: disabled 
and older persons, parents and especially single parents often face less job search 
requirements – formally (by law) and informally (by case manager).  
In sum, empirical research confirmed theoretical expectations that individual charac-
teristics like motivation, ability and risk-aversion, high search costs (employment 
barriers) and the frequency and quality of arriving job offers (also determined by 
local labor market situations) influence the sanction probability. Moreover, previous 
empirical research stressed the importance of the behavior of the case manager 
who potentially imposes a sanction. 
This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing empirical research on the effects of 
benefit sanctions by exploring the hypothesis of job search theory that benefit sanc-
tions directly reduce reservation wages. Contrary to most empirical research on 
sanctions, it regards unemployment benefit II sanctions, internationally more compa-
rable to social assistance sanctions than to UI sanctions.  
4 Data 
General description of the survey 
The data used for this analysis stems from a cross-section survey called “Life situa-
tion and social security 2005” that was conducted on behalf of the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) in Winter 2005/2006. The purpose of the survey was to 
obtain information about the effects of the implementation of the new SC II on per-
sons concerned. Hence, the target population of the survey consists of two groups: 
first, of course, the unemployment benefit II recipients in January 2005 (with their 
need communities), and second, registered unemployed receiving unemployment 
assistance in December 2004 who did not receive unemployment benefit II in Janu-
ary 2005 (“drop-outs”).  
The sample population differed from the target population, because at the time when 
the IAB drew the sample population from the administrative data of the Federal Em-
ployment Agency, there was information only on 4.1 of the approximately 6.3 million 
people affected by the reform (see infas 2006). For 173 of all 439 German districts, 
there was only information on all former UA recipients in December 2004, inde-
pendently of their SC II receipt in January 2005, and no full information about those 
unemployment benefit II recipients who received social assistance or no benefits in 
December 2004. Since the gross sample was randomly selected from the sample 
population, the UB II recipients formerly receiving unemployment insurance benefits 
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should be overrepresented in the gross sample relative to those formerly receiving 
social assistance or no benefits.16 
Of the gross sample, 27 percent could not be interviewed.17 Of all people remaining 
in the gross sample, the interview was successfully realized with 20,832 people (39 
percent). The others did refuse to answer (46 percent) or were not accessible (15 
percent).18 A sensitivity analysis regarding selectivity due to design and conductibil-
ity of the survey found that better qualified persons, native Germans, East Germans, 
women and people living in multi-person households participated more often.19 
When interpreting the results of my analysis, one should bear in mind that in the 
realized sample, there is a slight overrepresentation of persons with relatively high 
social integration and chances of employment (infas 2006). 
The survey is the only dataset available for analyzing effects of UB II sanctions in 
2005, directly after the new SC II came into force. Due to the mentioned data prob-
lems of the Federal Employment Agency, there is no administrative data on sanc-
tions for the year 2005. An advantage of the dataset in comparison to administrative 
data from later periods is the extensive information it contains − both about the im-
plementation of UB II during the year 2005 (i.e. detailed information on benefit re-
ceipt, exits out of benefit, requirements, monitoring and sanctions) and the private 
                                                
16  The samples were drawn from data from the ARGE-software “A2LL” and from data from 
the software in the employment offices (responsible for UA recipients). Both datasets are 
linked by a unique identity key for each person. For 266 districts, the full target population 
is available. For the 69 opting municipalities no data on UB II recipients in January 2005 
was available at all when the samples were drawn in June 2005; for further 104 districts 
only the population of UA recipients in December 2004 is available independently of their 
UB II receipt in January 2005 due to organizational and software problems.  
17  Mostly their contact information was incorrect (telephone number not available, address 
wrong: 22 percent). The rest did not understand the interviewer because they spoke an-
other language than German, Russian, Turkish or Croatian (4 percent). A few were ill or 
deceased. 
18  The interviewers explained the comparably low response rate with difficult external condi-
tions and a demanding questionnaire. The external conditions were difficult for the inter-
viewers because the potential respondents were afraid of being controlled through the in-
terviewer, did not trust affirmations of anonymity or were disappointed and filled with bit-
terness and hostility towards the Federal Employment Agency and the media. During that 
time, problems with control and moral hazard of UB II recipients were widely and drasti-
cally discussed in the media ("parasitic behavior"). In this context, the aim of the survey 
was difficult to communicate. Furthermore, the interview was very long (on average one 
hour and 16 minutes), it asked sensitive questions about the personal situation of the re-
spondent, and some questions appeared to be difficult to understand.  
19 In the gross sample, there were 15.2 percent without a school degree, 19.5 percent left 
school with 15 years with a “Hauptschulabschluss” (secondary general school certificate), 
35.2 percent were vocationally trained and 5.3 percent had higher qualification than that. 
In the final sample 11.2 percent had no degree, 16.4 percent a Hauptschulabschluss, 
41.9 percent a vocational training and 7.5 percent a higher qualification. Similarly over-
represented are native Germans (63.6 percent in the gross sample vs. 68.2 percent), 
persons living in East Germany (39.8 percent vs. 43.6 percent), women (47.7 percent vs. 
51.9 percent), and, but only slightly, young respondents under 18 years and respondents 
living in smaller cities up to 5,000 inhabitants. Singles are underrepresented (39.7 per-
cent vs. 37.3 percent). Older people were easier accessible, but refused to answer more 
often at the same time, so there is no selectivity bias here.  
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and professional background of the interviewed persons, including their reservation 
wages. Individual employment histories are available via spell data the person re-
ported on all kinds of labor market states from the end of school until the date of the 
interview, on a monthly basis (spells of employment, non-employment, unemploy-
ment, active labor market schemes and qualification).  
Figure 1 displays how the information for my analysis was collected. The survey’s 
period of interest is the period between December 2004, just before SC II came into 
force, and the interview date between end of November 2005 and end of March 
2006. Interviewers asked for the reservation wage at the actual time of the interview. 
They did not ask for the reservation wage in December 2004, taking into account 
that it is highly unlikely that people correctly remember their reservation wages from 
one year before. Information on sanctions is asked for each month of UB II benefit 
receipt from January 2005 until the time of the interview.  
Figure 1 
The survey’s period of interest and collection of information on reservation wage 
and sanctions on the time line 
 
Source: IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”. Own illustration. 
 
Interviewers asked in two steps several questions to find out the net hourly reserva-
tion wage, of both employed and unemployed people. The first set of questions asks 
for the net hourly wage people expect to receive in their next job; the second set of 
questions asks for a reservation wage that might lie below the expected wage, rep-
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resenting the lowest limit of their wage demands.20 I assume that this stepwise col-
lection of hourly reservation wages transmits the idea of the reservation wage better 
to the respondents than a one-step collection of monthly information as typically 
done in similar surveys (e.g. the GSOEP); therefore I expect less reliability problems 
otherwise common to measures of reservation wages. An additional advantage of 
the reservation wage information is that both employed and unemployed persons 
were asked for their reservation wage; hence, the variable of interest is measured in 
an identical way for both groups and not proxied by the accepted net wages of the 
employed persons.  
Sample selection 
To estimate the effect of a first sanction after entering UB II on the hourly reserva-
tion wage, I constructed the sample of analysis as follows (see Table 2 for the speci-
fication of selection’s magnitudes): 1.) To focus on the target group of my research 
question, I take only UB II benefit recipients in the sample who entered UB II benefit 
receipt between January and March 2005 (to allow for a common time lag between 
the UB II application and its approval); “drop-outs” are excluded. 2.) I exclude per-
sons who were older than 57 years or retired in December 2004 because, as men-
tioned, they face less or no risk respectively to receive a sanction. 3.) I also exclude 
people with missing information on hourly reservation wages and sanctions (includ-
ing the timing of a sanction).  
4.) Considering my target group, I assume reservation wages to be plausible if they 
lie between one Euro and 20 Euro per hour: the equivalent an hourly labor income 
of 20 Euro per hour is 3,200 Euro (net) labor income per month if one would work 
full-time. This assumption excludes less than one percent of the observations (32 
observations with reported values of less than one Euro and 64 observations with 
values of more than 20 Euro). 5.) For the estimation of the treatment effect, I con-
sider only the first UB II spell of each sample member. I assume that a person re-
ceiving UB II for the first time, e.g. for three months without interruption, is treated 
differently than a person receiving UB II a second or third time, e.g. for three months 
for the second time in a year. This assumption excludes 23 people (0.2 percent) 
who were sanctioned in a later UB II spell.  
                                                
20  1.) „What net wage do you expect to earn per month?” (“Was erwarten Sie, monatlich 
netto zu verdienen?”), companied by a question asking how many hours per week the 
person would expect to work for the reported amount. 2.a) Persons who did answer ques-
tion one are asked in a second step if they would be willing to work for a monthly net 
wage lower than the first reported value (“Wären Sie auch bereit für einen Netto-
Monatslohn zu arbeiten, der geringer ist als der angegebene Lohn?“). If so, they are 
asked for this reservation wage per month they would be willing to work for (“Wie hoch 
müsste dieser geringere Netto-Monatslohn dann mindestens sein, damit Sie noch bereit 
wären, dafür zu arbeiten?“). Again, persons are asked for the working hours per week 
they expect to work for this reported net reservation wage. 2.b). Persons who refuse to 
answer question one are in a second step asked: „What is the least net wage per month 
you would be willing to work for?” (“Wie hoch müsste Ihr Netto-Monatslohn mindestens 
sein, damit Sie noch bereit wären, dafür zu arbeiten?”), together with the working hours 
they would expect to work. 
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To construct the key variables net reservation wages and sanctions (including the 
timing), I need full and plausible information of each final sample member on desired 
working hours, desired amount of wage per month and (for each month) if a sanc-
tion was imposed; hence, the sample gets smaller by dropping persons with miss-
ings on any of this information. Nonetheless, the selections do not seem to change 
the distributions of sanctions and reservation wages in the sample in an unintended 
way (see, again, Table 2). The median reservation wage of 5.77 Euro/hour does not 
change at all through the selections while the mean reservation wage is reduced 
from 6.22 Euro/hour to 6.06 Euro/hour through the exclusion of outliers. The share 
of sanctioned is reduced from 6.0 percent to 5.5 percent through the exclusion of 
people getting a sanction in a later UB II spell, and of people with relevant variables 
missing.  
Table 2 
Changes in reservation wage and in shares of sanctioned sample members due to 
sample construction 
  Sample size Share of the target sample 
Share of sanc-
tioned persons 
in sample  
Median reser-
vation wage 
euro/hour 
Mean reser-
vation wage 
euro/hour 
Total sample 20,839 - 5.9% 5.77 6.17 
1.) Target sample: entering 
unemployment benefit ii re-
ceipt in Jan., Feb. or Mar. 
2005 
15,232 100.0% 6.0% 5.77 6.22 
2.) Younger than 58 and not 
retired in December 2004  15,036 98.7% 6.0% 5.77 6.22 
3.) Information on both net 
reservation wages and sanc-
tions (incl. timing) 
12,951 85.0% 5.7% 5.77 6.22 
4.) Reservation wage be-
tween one and 20 €/h 12,855 84.4% 5.7% 5.77 6.06 
5.) Sanctions only in first spell 12,822 84.2% 5.5% 5.77 6.06 
Notes: The median reservation wage of 5.77 Euro per hour is due to typical combinations of desired net wages 
and working hours, like desired 1,000 Euro per month for 40 hours per week (with one month counting as 
4.33 weeks). 
Source: IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Own calculations. 
 
The following subsection describes additional details on sample members’ reserva-
tion wages, further characteristics, and the benefit sanctions they received.  
Description of the sample 
In the final sample remain 12,822 people (84 percent of the target sample). The 
sample is almost equally divided by gender and region (49 percent were women, 55 
percent living in West Germany, see also Table A 1 in the Appendix for details). At 
the time of the interview, 76 percent of the sample still received UB II.  
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Table 3 
Main labor market state (in percent of all sample members) 
 December 2004 Winter 2005/06 (interview) 
Change (in per-
centage points) 
Registered unemployed and/or in ALMP measures 
and training (without One-Euro-Jobs) 76.4 66.1 -10.2 
One-euro-jobs (incl. One-euro-job and registered 
unemployed) 3.2 9.2 6.0 
Employed/self-employed 9.1 13.9 4.8 
Vocational training or school 0.9 0.6 -0.4 
Nonemployment 10.4 10.2 -0.2 
Source: IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Own calculations. 
 
In Table 3, the main labor market state of the sample members is shown.21 At the 
time of their interview, three quarters of the sample members reported being regis-
tered unemployed and/or in active labor market measures (incl. One-Euro-jobs), or 
in school or vocational training. Five percent have never been employed in their life. 
The last employment of unemployed respondents who have ever been employed 
ended four years ago on average. 14 percent of the sample reported being mainly 
employed or self-employed, i.e. without at the same time being registered unem-
ployed or in an ALMP measure.22 Ten percent reported doing something else, like 
parental leave, household or care responsibilities, holidays, sickness, etc. Five per-
cent have never been employed in their life. Compared to December 2004, ten per-
centage points less sample members were registered unemployed and/or in an 
ALMP measure. Five percentage points more sample members were employed at 
the time of their interview than one year before, and six percentage points more at-
tended One-Euro-Jobs. 
In Table 4, the type of employment is characterized for the 14 percent of the sample 
who report being mainly employed or self-employed at the time of the interview. 
Most are regularly employed (this share significantly increased during the observa-
tion period); the second largest share is occasional or minor employed. The average 
net wage of the last employment (for employed the current employment) was 6.02 
Euro/hour. 86 percent of the regular or minor employed people were employed in a 
job subject to social insurance contributions. 36 percent of the employed still re-
ceived UB II.  
                                                
21  Most respondents reported parallel labor market spells, e.g. at the same time “doing 
something else”, “being in training” and “being employed”. Since it is assumed that regis-
tered unemployed people and people attending ALMP measures of short and medium 
duration have to fulfill search requirements and in case of non-compliance can be sanc-
tioned, the labor market status of one person is categorized according to the following 
priorities: 1. unemployment including ALMP measures without job-creating measures 
(ABM), 2. (self-)employment, 3. school or vocational training, and 4. nonemployment. 
Only the first priority state is listed. 
22  Of all sample members, not 14 percent but 24 percent reported being employed at the 
time of the interview; but of these 24 percent, 42 percent reported being unemployed 
and/or in an integration measure at the same time, so they were categorized as being 
unemployed or in ALMP measures. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 19/2008 23 
Table 4 
Mean characteristics of employment 
 December 2004 Winter 2005/06 
Type of employment 
Job-creating measure (ABM) 7.33 6.18 
Employment in Personal Service Agency 1.52 1.98 
Job try-out/internship 3.88 1.76 
Occasional or minor employment 35.72 24.49 
Subsidized self-employment 1.43 2.15 
Regular employment/self-employment 50.13 63.44 
Net wage in euro/hour 6.21 6.02 
Employed subject to social insurance contributions (in percent of all 
minor or regular employed)a 77.68 85.64 
Notes: The type of employment is characterized for those people who report being mainly employed or self-
employed and not being registered unemployed or in an ALMP measure at the same time. a. Question 
was only asked for minor or regular employment.  
Source: IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Own calculations. 
 
The level of qualification was not particularly high: 28 percent were low qualified, 60 
percent have an intermediate qualification, five percent were highly qualified and 
seven percent very highly qualified.23 68 percent had German nationality, parents 
and interview language; a complete non-German background characterized ten per-
cent of the sample and 22 percent reported mixed features (other nationality, par-
ents or interview language). 22 percent lived together with other earners in the 
household. More than half of the sample members (56 percent) lived without a part-
ner in the household (24 percent of them as single parents with children). The other 
44 percent lived as couple, mostly with an un- or nonemployed partner, less often 
with an employed partner (of these, 38 percent with an un- or nonemployed partner 
with children and 30 percent without children, 19 percent with an employed partner 
with children and 14 percent without children). This description evokes the picture 
that sample members’ chances of finding a job are below average. 
On average, people expected to earn net 6.98 Euro per hour, but 78 percent stated 
to work for a reservation wage lower than that. The average net reservation wage is 
6.06 Euro/hour (5.77 Euro/hour in the median), as already shown in Table 2.24 In 
East Germany, the mean reservation wage was lower (5.41 Euro) than in West 
                                                
23  Low qualified means no graduation or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule 
and no vocational training, middle qualified means (Fach-)Abitur and no vocational train-
ing, or graduation Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and apprenticeship, highly qualified 
means (Fach-)Abitur and apprenticeship or master craftsmen and very highly qualified 
means university degree. 
24  Note that I analyze hourly reservation wages and not the reservation wage ratio (rwr), the 
ratio between reservation wage and last net wage. Information on last net wages (i.e. 
wages resulting from an employment that started before our observation period 2005), 
and thus, on rwr, are only available for jobs lasting at least until January 2004; but three 
quarters of the sample members were already unemployed at this time. Thus, missings in 
last net wages are not a reason for exclusion. Due to our target group, reported net 
wages under one Euro per factual working hour (in 91 cases) and over 50 Euro (in two 
cases) are assumed to be implausible and put to missings.  
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Germany (6.57 Euro). In 2005, net wages at the bottom tenth percentile of the wage 
distribution reported in the GSOEP were 6.05 Euro/hour in East Germany and 7.97 
Euro/hour in West Germany (own calculations based on Gernandt and Pfeiffer 
2006). Based on administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency on all 
workers employed subject to social insurance contributions, Rhein and Stamm 
(2006) calculated for 2004 the upper threshold for low-wage jobs (defined as two-
thirds of the median gross wage). It was 10.20 Euro/hour in West Germany and 7.40 
Euro in East Germany.25 Thus, reservation wages of the sample members are posi-
tioned at the very bottom of the German wage distribution, within the low-wage sec-
tor.  
This is important for two reasons. First, low reservation wages probably reflect the 
sample members’ realistic perception of own modest labor market prospects. Sec-
ond, and very relevant for my analysis, they imply that the sample members would 
accept almost every wage offer since most paid net wages lie above their reserva-
tion wages. 
Reservation wages vary not only between sample members living in East and West 
Germany, but also with other variables suggested in the literature reviewed above. 
Relatively high reservation wages are reported by men, by older people, by people 
with financial responsibilities for family members (married, having children in the 
household, no other earners in household), by better qualified people with higher 
last net wages, by former UI recipients but also by long-term unemployed with miss-
ing net wages (see the results of OLS regressions of the log net hourly reservation 
wage in the Appendix Table A 3). Reservation wages do not significantly vary with 
received sanctions on average: the 702 sanctioned sample members reported a 
mean reservation wage of 6.11 Euro/hour; the 12,120 persons without a sanction 
reported a wage of 6.05 Euro/hour. The values are not statistically different at a sig-
nificance level of 0.1 percent. A simple eyeball test of the histograms of the reserva-
tion wages by treatment status supports the resemblance of their distributions (see 
Figure 2). 
                                                
25  In 2004, 18.4 percent of all full-time workers received a gross wage below this threshold 
(Rhein and Stamm 2006). 
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Figure 2 
Density histograms of net hourly reservation wages in Euro by treatment status 
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Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”. Own illustration. 
 
The share of sanctioned UB II recipients varies with certain characteristics of sample 
members. In Table 5, the variations in the average share of 5.5 percent sanctioned 
UB II recipients are described within the categories region, age, partner, other 
earner, under-age children in household, qualification and migration status. In Table 
A 1 in the Appendix, you find additional information on mean differences between 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned sample members for numerous other characteris-
tics. Younger and less qualified persons received more sanctions. Parents, persons 
with other earners in the houshold and West Germans in districts with better labor 
market conditions received more sanctions (significant at the one percent level). 
Sanctioned sample members lived in districts where people were unemployed for 
shorter periods and received more job offers.26 
                                                
26  Unemployment lasted on average 15.5 months in districts of sanctioned sample members 
instead of 15.9 months; the unemployment rate was 14.5 percent instead of 15.6 percent; 
and five instead of four jobs were offered to 100 registered unemployed. 
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Table 5 
Share of sanctioned UB II recipients in different groups 2005 
 Percentage of persons with sanction 
Region 
West Germany 6.2 
East Germany 4.6 
Age  
15 to 25 years old 10.4 
25 to 40 years old 5.9 
40 to 50 years old 4.6 
50 to 58 years old 3.0 
Partner in household  
No partner 5.7 
Employed partner 5.8 
Non-/unemployed partner 4.9 
Other earners in household 
No 5.2 
Yes 6.6 
Children under 18 years in household  
No 5.2 
Yes 5.9 
Very high 3.4 
Qualification 
Low  6.9 
Middle  5.1 
High  5.4 
Migration status 
Non-German 6.3 
Ambiguous 5.6 
German 5.3 
Total 5.5 
Notes:  Sanctions received in the first UB II spell are described. 
Source:  IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
 
As already mentioned, 5.5 percent of the sample received a sanction. Three quar-
ters of the sanctioned sample members received one sanction during the observa-
tion period, and one quarter received two or more. A sanctioned UB II recipient re-
ceived UB II for on average seven months before the sanction. Of the sanctioned 
UB II recipients, 75 percent never left UB II receipt after the sanction; those who did 
left UB II receipt on average four months after the sanction was imposed (spread 
with a standard deviation of 2.8 months). The rate of UB II recipients receiving a 
sanction per calendar month increased during 2005 from less than one percent in 
Spring 2005 to 2.5 percent in Winter 2005 (see Table 6). Hence, sanctions were 
imposed with increased intensity after the implementation of the SC II. The total 
number of UB II recipients in the sample logically decreased over time because 
people stopped to receive UB II during the observation period. The sharp drop in 
observations from December 2005 on, however, results from the different interview 
dates, the earliest ones held end of November 2005, as mentioned. 
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Table 6 
Numbers of UB II recipients and mean sanction rates per calendar month  
in the observation period  
Year Month Mean sanction rate Number of UB II recipients 
2005 January 0.5% 12510 
 February 0.6% 12576 
 March 0.8% 12535 
 April 1.0% 12258 
 May 1.2% 12019 
 June 1.5% 11801 
 July 1.7% 11518 
 August 1.9% 11334 
 September 1.9% 11191 
 October 2.4% 11012 
 November 2.6% 10841 
 December 2.3% 7813 
2006 January 1.6% 4077 
 February 1.6% 2760 
 March 1.3% 780 
Notes: Sanctions received in the first UB II spell are described. The mean sanction rate is calculated 
as the share of sanctioned UB II recipients of the total number of people really receiving UB II 
in the respective calendar month. The difference between the whole sample size of 12,822 
people and the number of people really receiving UB II in the listed calendar months results 
from the fact that those sample members were selected for the final sample who received  
UB II the first time in January, February or March 2005; but since some sample members exit 
UB II receipt already after one or two months, the number of UB I recipients in February and 
March 2005 is reduced by these people. In later months, the number of UB II recipients con-
tinuously decreases because of sample members leaving UB II receipt. 
Source: IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
 
As mentioned above in Section two, there are various non-compliances of the UB II 
recipient that can lead to a sanction. The answers on the question for the justifica-
tions for the sanctions are shown in Table 7. Two justifications for a sanction given 
by law – 1) parallel UI benefit sanction and 2) intentional reduction of earnings and 
assets in order to be entitled to UB II benefits – are not given as possible justifica-
tions in the questionnaire, however.27 The largest part (36 percent) of the sanctioned 
who are older than 24 years answered that they received a sanction because of 
refusing or quitting jobs or integration measures, refusing to sign integration con-
tracts or not meeting duties of integration contracts, because of misinformation on 
income or assets or spending money in an uneconomical way (“justification one”). 
46 percent answered they were given “other reasons” for their sanction. This high 
percentage certainly entails the people who were told the two justifications missing 
                                                
27  In the interview, sanctioned UB II recipients could choose from the following possibilities 
the interviewer offered them as justifications received for the sanction: a) refused to sign 
an integration contract, b) for people with integration contracts: refused to meet duties of 
integration contract, c) refused or quit offered work, vocational training or work measure 
(“Arbeitsgelegenheit”), d) refused or quit integration measure (“Maßnahme”), e) did not 
report to the Job Center (“Meldeaufforderung nicht nachgekommen”), f) did not meet 
medical or psychological appointment, g) did not correctly report income and/or assets, h) 
accused of spending money in an uneconomical way, or i) other reasons given (alas, 
without a further specification). If all questions are answered with “no” or are missing, the 
sanctioned UB II recipient was asked if j) there were no reasons given.  
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in the questionnaire; nonetheless, almost all legally possible justifications are given 
in the questionnaire, hence, the share of sanctioned people who report other justifi-
cations than given in law remains surprisingly high. The picture of justifications for 
the sanctioned respondents who are younger than 25 years is a bit straighter: The 
majority (54 percent) received justification one.  
Table 7 
Justification for the sanctions imposed (in percent of all sanctioned) 
Justification for the sanction given in the questionnaire 25 to 57 years 15 to 24 years 
1: Refused to sign an integration contract, for people 
with integration contracts: refused to meet duties of 
integration contract, refused or quit offered work, voca-
tional training or work measure (“Arbeitsgelegenheit”), 
refused or quit integration measure (“Maßnahme”), did 
not correctly report income and/or assets, accused of 
spending money in an uneconomical way 
36 54 
2: Did not report to the Job Center (“Meldeaufforderung 
nicht nachgekommen”), did not meet medical or psycho-
logical appointment 
15 29 
3: Other reasons given 46 17 
4: No reasons given 3 1 
Notes: Described are sanctions for the first UB II spell. Values in grey indicate case numbers under 20. 
Source:  IAB-Survey "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
 
Only 20 percent of the sanctioned sample members fully accepted their sanction as 
justified. Depending on the type of justification for the sanction, a sanction lasted on 
average three months for justification one (as regulated by law). However, it lasted 
shorter (on average two months) for justification two or for “other reasons”. Two per-
cent of the 25year-and-older sanctioned benefit recipients, and five percent of the 
under-25-year-old ones, received in-kind transfers during the sanction.  
In sum, in 2005, the sample members’ chances of finding a job are below average, 
mirrored in their reservation wages positioned at the very bottom within the low-
wage sector of the German wage distribution. In the survey, the process of sanction-
ing was probably not adequately asked and understood by the sanctioned sample 
members. Alternatively, sanctions were imposed less systematically as intended by 
the regulations in the SC II. The increasing sanction rates until the observation pe-
riod indicate, however, that sanctioning became more systematically. Though each 
sanction is supposed to last three months, the duration of sanctions varied with justi-
fications. Even if imprecise questionnaires are accounted for, the communication 
and understanding of the justifications for sanctions seem to be improvable, in par-
ticular considering the share of sanctions imposed because of “other reasons” apart 
from the justifications one and two given in SC II. 
5 Methodology 
This paper wants to estimate the effect of benefit sanctions on the reservation 
wages of sanctioned unemployment benefit II recipients. The focus here is on the 
first sanction people may receive within their first spell of UB II in 2005, since the 
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used data stem from a survey of people who entered UB II for their first time in 2005 
and are observed for the limited period of a year. In an ideal scenario, I would have 
the same unemployment benefit II recipient in two parallel worlds. In world one, she 
receives a sanction, in world two, she does not - everything else equal. The effect of 
a sanction on her reservation wage would be the difference in her reservation wage 
of world one and world two.  
In the real world, I observe either the reservation wage when receiving a sanction for 
each sanctioned individual or the reservation wage when not receiving a sanction for 
each individual who did not receive a sanction. Taking the mean reservation wage of 
non-sanctioned individuals as an approximation for the potential mean reservation 
wage of sanctioned individuals – i.e. their reservation wage for the hypothetical 
situation that they were not sanctioned – would cause selection bias, since sanc-
tioned and non-sanctioned individuals usually differ even in the absence of treat-
ment (sanctioned individuals should at least partly show a different behavior, other-
wise they should not have received a sanction).28 The matching approach is one 
possible solution to deal with this selection problem.29 Its basic idea is to find non-
sanctioned individuals who are similar to the sanctioned individuals in all relevant 
characteristics before the sanction was imposed. If so, differences in reservation 
wages between this adequate control group and sanctioned individuals can be at-
tributed to the imposed sanction.  
The causal effect of imposed sanctions can be identified with statistical matching 
only if four assumptions hold: 1.) The data at hand include all relevant variables that 
affect both treatment assignment (receiving a sanction) and outcome (reservation 
wage). In formal terms, I must rely on a “Conditional Independence Assumption” 
(CIA, Lechner 1999).30 Moreover, I rely on the assumptions that 2.), apart from the 
mentioned ex-ante effect of a sanction, there are no general equilibrium effects: the 
fact that sample member one is sanctioned does not change the reservation wage 
of sample member two (SUTVA or consistency condition); that 3.), the relevant con-
ditioning variables should be exogenous in terms of not being influenced by the 
sanction in a way that is related to the reservation wages ; and that 4.), for a given 
                                                
28  There are many microeconometric evaluation studies of active labor market policies in 
Europe dealing with selection bias caused by 1) caseworkers selecting specific types of 
unemployed into specific programs and 2) specific unemployed self-selecting into specific 
programs (see e.g. the survey of Heckman et al. 1999). 
29  The standard framework in evaluation analysis to formalize this problem is the “Roy-
Rubin-model” (Roy 1951, Rubin 1974). The matching approach was originally developed 
in the statistical literature; see e.g. the benchmark paper of Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). It is widely applied when evaluating labor market policies (see e.g. Dehejia and 
Wahba 1999 or Heckman et al. 1997). Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) offer a comprehen-
sive and practical guideline for the special case of propensity score matching (see be-
low). 
30  This assumption is alternatively referred to as “unconfoundedness” (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983) or “selection on observables” (Heckman and Robb 1985). 
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value of the relevant conditioning variables, both sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
sample members could potentially be observed (“common support condition”).31  
The first assumption, the CIA, is the strongest, and I will argue below why I assume 
that it holds. The second assumption of no general equilibrium effects of imposed 
sanctions is plausible since the observed shares of sanctioned of below three per-
cent per calendar month are so small that the actual imposition of these sanctions 
does not plausibly change reservation wages of non-sanctioned sample members. 
The third assumption of exogeneity of relevant control variables implies that I use as 
controls only variables determined prior to the sanction. The fourth assumption im-
plies that statistical matching is performed only on common support.  
I assume that the CIA holds because of my unusually informative data and the 
rather unsystematic sanctioning process in the first year of the new SC II. That is, I 
assume that, for my observation period and conditional on the rich set of variables in 
my dataset, the reservation wages associated with receiving a sanction or not re-
ceiving a sanction are independent of the real sanction imposed by the caseworker. 
Though very strong the CIA is plausible for two reasons.  
First, the data are very rich and include a great number of variables that are theo-
retically important for the sanctioning process and reservation wages. This involves 
demographic variables (age, gender, detailed household context with age and num-
ber of own children, existence and employment status of partner, marital state, na-
tionality and nationality of parents, language skills) and variables related to pre-
observation period skill levels, employment history and benefit receipt (education 
and vocational training, ever employed, duration of employment, unemployment, 
non-employment, school education and vocational training in the past, last earnings, 
receipt of unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and social assis-
tance); besides, variables related to details of the local labor market (unemployment 
rate and duration, share of migrants, women, younger persons and long-term un-
employed of all unemployed, share of service jobs, ratio of offered jobs to all unem-
ployed UB II recipients and ratio of One-Euro-Jobs to all UB II recipients).  
The detailed information on the individual’s labor market position and household 
context should be strongly related to important unobservable factors like the individ-
ual’s motivation, social skills and risk aversion; all factors that, as I saw, would influ-
ence both reservation wage and the risk of receiving a sanction. Therefore, I take 
them as good proxies for these unobservable characteristics. 
Second, in my observation period the new sanction regime of SC II was just being 
implemented. For this period, the local Job Centers were heavily criticized for uns-
                                                
31  See Lechner (2007) for a detailed description of the identifying assumptions.  
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ystematically sanctioning UB II recipients.32 Remember that I consider a period 
where a completely new benefit system was set up and the institutions that deal with 
it, too. There were major tasks to fulfill like a new means test for all potentially needy 
households, moreover for all able-to-work members of needy households, a profiling 
had to be carried out and an integration contract needed to be fixed. That in such a 
context many people who could have been sanctioned were actually not, is likely. 
Probably, monitoring was quite unsystematic and even if the reasons for a sanction 
were properly observed, there was just not sufficient qualified personnel in the Job 
Centers to deal with all cases. This practice of rather unsystematic sanctioning is 
already indicated by the unexpected variance in duration and degree of sanctions in 
my data that I mentioned while describing the data.  
But apart from problems due to the implementation period of new SC II, the assump-
tion of a rather unsystematic performance of case managers is echoed in Lechner 
and Smith (2007). On the basis of Swiss data on the assignment of UI benefit re-
cipients to eight active labor market programs in 1998 they conclude that integration 
efforts of Swiss employment officers achieve about the same employment rates one 
year after program initiation as would result from assigning the unemployed ran-
domly to the available treatments in their existing proportions (and that they achieve 
clearly worse employment rates than assignment according to statistical treatment 
rules based on observables does). 
In formal terms, we face the following situation. Let Z be the vector of all observable 
and not observable characteristics which influence both whether an UB II recipient 
receives a sanction (D=1, otherwise D=0) and the level of her reservation wage r. 
My task is to estimate the average impact from a sanction for persons characterized 
by observable characteristics X that are a subset of Z, by simply comparing the res-
ervation wage r1 of a sanctioned person and r2 of a not sanctioned person character-
ized by X. Thus, it is necessary (1) that the sanctioning of sanctioned persons and 
their behavioral responses are captured by the observable characteristics X, and 
thus the average effect of receiving a sanction is the same for a sanctioned person 
and a person who was not sanctioned (CIA).  
That is the same as postulating that  X | D  r,r 10 ⊥ , i.e. both potential reservation 
wages are independent of assignment to treatment D given the observable charac-
teristics X. Similar to randomization in a social experiment, statistical matching bal-
ances the distributions of all relevant, pre-treatment characteristics X in the treat-
ment and comparison group. Thus it achieves independence between potential out-
comes and the assignment to treatment. In formal terms, E(r0 | X,D = 1) = E(r0 | X,D 
                                                
32  The German Federal Court of Audit (“Bundesrechnungshof”) inspected in 2006 the Fed-
eral Employment Agency, 70 ARGEs and 20 opting municipalities (Bundesrechnungshof 
2006: 13, own translation): “In six out of ten examined cases, the Job Center did not fol-
low up hints for facts that would lead to a sanction. In most cases, the benefit recipients 
did not register with the Job Center though they were legally informed of legal conse-
quences or did refuse to accept an appropriate job without proving an important reason.” 
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= 0) = E(r0 | X) and E(r1 | X,D = 1) = E(r1 | X,D = 0) = E(r1 | X). The missing counter-
factual mean reservation wages can be constructed from the outcomes of partici-
pants and non-participants: I construct E(r0 | X,D = 1) from E(r0 | X,D = 0).33 The 
unbiased estimator of the average impact of a sanction on the sanctioned (ATT) can 
therefore be written )1,|( 01 =−= DXrrEATT .  
Since conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited in case of a high dimensional 
vector X (`curse of dimensionality'), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use 
of balancing scores b(X) that are specific functions of the relevant observed covari-
ates X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of as-
signment into treatment.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) found that if the treatment is independent of the 
treatment assignment conditional on X, then it is also independent conditional on 
balancing scores b(X) that fulfil the so-called “balancing score property”. If the bal-
ancing score property holds, then after matching on the balancing score, there will 
be no statistically significant differences in the covariate distributions between the 
treatment and comparison observations for each distinct value of the estimated bal-
ancing score; the covariates should be balanced in both groups. One possible bal-
ancing score is the propensity score. The propensity score is the probability of being 
treated given observed characteristics X. Hence, if the CIA holds for some set of 
variables, then it also holds when conditioning on the propensity score 
p(X)=P(D=1|X=x).  
Ideally, in the propensity score estimation the duration of benefit receipt until the 
received sanction would be included for several reasons. First, because I consider a 
system of ongoing sanctions, taking place continuously over the observed period 
from January 2005 until the interview date (between November 2005 and March 
2006), people could stop receiving UB II during the observation period and therefore 
stop being at risk of receiving a sanction. All potential controls to a sanctioned per-
son should have at least received unemployment benefit II as long as the sanc-
tioned person when the sanction took place. Second, I mentioned already that be-
cause of the implementation problems of the new SC II, the use of sanctions in-
creased over the time. Third, the behavior of a benefit recipient had to be watched 
by the case manager first, so that the probability of sanctions increased with benefit 
duration.  
Fourth, the elapsed benefit duration is likely to capture to some extent a person’s 
unobserved ability and motivation to exit benefit duration. Ability and motivation, 
again, will have an impact on reservation wages. But it is not possible to use the 
whole duration of UB II receipt as regressor in the propensity score because for 
                                                
33  Actually, since I am interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
CIA can be relaxed to  X | D  r0 ⊥  (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). I assume, however, for 
the reasons given above, that the stronger version of the CIA holds. 
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sanctioned persons, duration of unemployment benefit II receipt after a sanction 
might be influenced by the sanction. Therefore, the duration of unemployment bene-
fit II receipt after a sanction is endogenous. The obvious problem is that for the non-
sanctioned, the duration of UB II receipt before a sanction which they never received 
is known purely hypothetical and thus cannot be included in the estimation of the 
propensity score.  
To take care of this problem, I follow Sianesi (2004) and estimate both the propen-
sity score and the average treatment parameter separately for each of the first four 
quarters of individual uninterrupted UB II receipt (see also Fitzenberger and Völter 
2007 for an application of the approach with strata, not single months). The eligibles 
for each estimation sample are those people who either 1) received a sanction in 
quarter u=1,2,3,4 of their first, uninterrupted UB II spell, or 2) were at risk of receiv-
ing a sanction in quarter u because they continued to receive UB II until the end of 
quarter u but never received a sanction during the observation period. Figure 3 illus-
trates who of the sample members is eligible for each estimation sample. 
Figure 3 
Eligibles for the four estimation samples 
 Month of individual uninterrupted UB II receipt 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Sample 1 
Treated S or UB II 
S or 
UB II 
S or 
UB II …         
Controls UB II UB II UB II …         
Sample 2 
Treated UB II UB II UB II S or UB II 
S or 
UB II 
S or 
UB II …      
Controls UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II …      
Sample 3 
Treated UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II S or UB II 
S or 
UB II 
S or 
UB II …   
Controls UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II …   
Sample 4 
Treated UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II S or UB II 
S or 
UB II 
S or 
UB II 
Controls UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II UB II 
Notes: Treated in sample u (u=1, 2, 3, 4) are UB II recipients who received a sanction S which started in one of 
the three months of quarter u of their first UB II spell. Controls in sample u are UB II recipients who re-
ceived UB II at least until the end of quarter u and received never a sanction during the one year of obser-
vation. In case people received more than one sanction, they are eligible only in the quarter where their 
first sanction starts (as treated). 
Source: Own illustration.  
 
Sample two, for example, contains all persons receiving at least six months UB II 
without being sanctioned during the observation period (“controls”) and all persons 
receiving a sanction in month four, five or six after entering UB II receipt (“treated”). I 
exclude people as controls from sample two who received a sanction in quarter one, 
three or four. If I would compare the reservation wages (that are reported after quar-
ter four, remember) between people sanctioned in quarter two and people sanc-
tioned in any of the other three quarters, the reservation wages of the sanctioned 
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controls would also be influenced by the sanction they received before or after quar-
ter two and the estimation result would be biased. This approach differs from 
Sianesi (2004) insofar as treated can never be controls because controls can never 
receive a sanction – but only for the limited observation period of one year.  
The starting month of the sanction defines in which quarter the sanction was im-
posed, i.e. the treatment took place; a sanction imposed, say, in quarter two that still 
lasts in quarter three, is counted only in quarter two. Implicitly I assume hereby, that 
the actual beginning of a sanction within one quarter is random conditional on X. In 
case people received more than one sanction during the observation period, they 
are eligible for an estimation sample only once: in the quarter where their first sanc-
tion starts (as treated).  
For the eligibles at u, treatment receipt is denoted by Du, that is Du = 1 for receiving 
a sanction that started in quarter u, and Du = 0 for never being sanctioned during all 
quarters u of the observation period. The estimated treatment parameter for each 
quarter u is then ATTu = E(r1 − r0|X, Du = 1)= E(r1|X,Du = 1) − EX [E(r0|X, Du = 1)| Du 
= 1] = E(r1|X,Du = 1) − EX [E((r0|X, Du = 0)| Du = 1], where the first term can be esti-
mated from the treatment group and the second term from the mean outcomes of 
the matched controls. The outer expectation is taken over the distribution of X in the 
treated population. 
In the propensity score estimation, I include variables theoretically related to both 
the probability to receive a sanction and to the level of reservation wages (see Sec-
tion Results). There are various procedures of propensity score matching to calcu-
late the impact of a treatment. They differ in the decision which controls to use for a 
treated observation, but for the calculation of the impact they take all the mean dif-
ference in outcomes between treated and controls (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008 
for details).  
I preferred to use Radius-Matching with replacement as straightforward matching 
procedure in order to be able to achieve unbiased estimates without paying for it 
with enormous variance. This made sense because though my sample is of medium 
size the estimated propensity scores between treated and controls were similar (see 
Section Results). Radius-Matching defines as controls for a treated individual all 
non-treated individuals whose estimated propensity score is within a radius (deter-
mined by a chosen maximum absolute propensity score distance) of the propensity 
score of the treated individual. By matching only within the determined radius I made 
sure that only the subset of the comparison group that is comparable to the treat-
ment group was used in the analysis. Matching with replacement means that appro-
priate controls could be used more than once as a match.34  
                                                
34  For the analytical variances and hence the standard errors of these estimators see 
Becker and Ichino (2002). 
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I decided to keep a rich specification of the propensity score model that is essen-
tially based on my theoretical considerations and results of previous empirical litera-
ture on benefit sanctions and reservation wages. This helps to account best possible 
for potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity and maintains the CIA plausible 
instead of relying mainly on statistical significance of the regressors given that the 
balancing score property is met. The balancing score property is testable by per-
forming mean comparison tests for both samples of treated and controls to make 
sure that there are no significant differences in covariate means.35  
A common procedure to further assess the matching quality is to check the reduc-
tion of standardized bias36 between treated and controls through the matching, for 
every covariate and all covariates together, as well as likelihood-ratio tests of joint 
insignificance of all regressors in the propensity score estimation before and after 
matching. The reduction of the standardized bias clearly shows the bias reduction 
before and after matching. The t-tests give the statistical significance of the results. 
Note that the policy question is not: Does the existence of sanctions lower the reser-
vation wage of those UB II recipients who received a sanction? Instead, it is: Do UB 
II recipients who received a sanction at a given period of their UB II receipt lower 
their reservation wage in comparison to those who continue receiving benefits in this 
period the sanction takes place (and never were sanctioned in the observed year)? 
6 Estimation results 
To put it briefly, in order to know how the mean reservation wage of sanctioned UB 
II recipients changes due to the event and timing of the sanction, I took account of 
the timing of the sanction and estimated the effect separately for the first four quar-
ters of uninterrupted UB II receipt by matching on the propensity score. Each sam-
ple contained the population at risk of receiving a first UB II sanction at the given 
quarter of their first uninterrupted spell of UB II receipt. For my methodological ap-
proach, I needed to eliminate potential selection bias between treated and controls 
by controlling for relevant variables in the propensity score estimation that influence 
both the probability to receive a UB II sanction and reservation wages.  
                                                
35  See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008) for more details on the assessment of the quality of the matching. The t-
tests on the equality of means are performed in a regression setting, assuming homoske-
dastic errors (Leuven and Sianesi 2003, Stata Corporation 2005: p. 485). Let x and y rep-
resent the observations of treated and controls respectively, n the number of observa-
tions, s the standard deviation. The formula of the t-statistic is   
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Student’s t with nx+ny-2 degrees of freedom.  
36  The standardized bias is the difference of the sample means of treated and controls as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and 
non-treated groups. 
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To account for the behavior of the individual UB II recipient, in the propensity score 
estimation I included demographic variables (age, gender, detailed household con-
text with age and number of own children, existence and employment status of part-
ner, marital state, nationality and nationality of parents, language skills) and vari-
ables related to pre-observation period skill levels, employment history and benefit 
receipt (education and vocational training, ever employed, employed at 31st De-
cember 2004, duration of employment, unemployment and qualification in the five 
years before December 2004, last earnings, receipt of benefits in December 2004, 
driver license) as well as if the UB II recipient signed an integration contract (includ-
ing the timing).  
Following previous results in the literature on benefit sanctions and reservation 
wages (see Section Theoretical considerations and previous empirical results), the 
chosen individual characteristics are assumed to capture motivation, chances and 
costs (employment barriers) to reintegrate into the labor market, signaled from the 
part of the UB II recipient and perceived by the employment office. Highly qualified, 
skilled people with long employment periods, short unemployment periods and fi-
nancial responsibilities for relatives are assumed to be better motivated and face 
less search costs. Better motivation to find a job and less search costs is assumed 
to lead to a low sanction probability. At the same time, this type of people has higher 
chances of receiving a job offer, which they then might reject. This might lead to a 
high sanction probability. In contrast, older people, women, migrants and people 
with problems of childcare, language and transportation are assumed to face higher 
search costs and less chances of receiving a job offer. Furthermore, these social 
groups might be discriminated by the case manager. These factors can lead to ei-
ther lower or higher sanction probability.  
To account for the behavior of case managers and the local labor market situation, I 
included variables for the level, structure and dynamics of local unemployment in 
December 2004 (West or East Germany, information by district on unemployment 
rates, the average unemployment duration and proportions of statistically disadvan-
taged unemployed like long-term unemployed, foreigner, young people and women, 
the share of service jobs of all jobs subject to social insurance contributions per dis-
trict as a proxy for structural change of a region and the ratio of offered jobs to all 
unemployed per district) and the number of One-Euro-Jobs to all unemployed by 
district for 2005 (proxying the extent of active labor market policy). 
Whether and when UB II recipients received integration contracts is assumed to 
raise monitoring and the sanction probability while reducing the reservation wage. 
The regional labor market variables proxy the amount of job offers and offers for 
labor market measures a UB II recipient can expect: the more offers, the higher the 
sanction probability. Sanction ‘philosophies’ by German counties (“Bundesländer”) 
are assumed to capture additional labor market characteristics I cannot observe but 
the Job Centers can. Both sets of variables therefore are assumed to influence the 
individual probability to receive a sanction and equally influence reservation wages.  
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Remember that I took the duration of ongoing unemployment and UB II receipt into 
account by estimating the effects for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II 
receipt. These variables are important as they capture unobserved ability and moti-
vation of the UB II recipients and unobserved increases in monitoring on behalf of 
the employment officer.  
Sample averages of the covariates are displayed in the Appendix Table A 1. Details 
on the specification of the probit estimation and the estimation results for all four 
quarters are presented in the Appendix Table A 2. In Table 8, for each quarter pro-
pensity scores are shown for treated and controls.  
Table 8 
Propensity Scores as a function of treatment status 
Propensity scores of sanctioned sample 
members 
Propensity scores of non-sanctioned sample 
members   
Minimum Mean Maximum SD Minimum Mean Maximum SD 
Quarter 1 0.001 0.019 0.068 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.085 0.009 
Quarter 2 0.002 0.043 0.252 0.042 0.000 0.015 0.261 0.020 
Quarter 3 0.004 0.030 0.106 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.167 0.015 
Quarter 4 0.009 0.083 0.310 0.060 0.000 0.044 0.346 0.040 
Source: IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”. 
 
The mean probability to receive a sanction for treated steadily increases from 0.02 
in the first quarter to 0.08 in the fourth quarter; the mean probability to receive a 
sanction for controls stayed between 0.01 and 0.02 for the first three quarters and 
rose to 0.04 in the fourth quarter. The estimated average propensity scores for 
treated are always within the minimum and the maximum propensity score of the 
controls, while the standard deviation of their propensity scores is higher. In the Ap-
pendix Figures A 1 to A 4, the kernel density estimations of the propensity scores 
are presented for treated and controls respectively. That mean propensity scores of 
the treated increase with time supports the importance of considering the timing of 
sanctions when matching on the propensity score. 
Not only the propensity score, also the share of treated increases with time: The 
number of treated rises from 105 in the first quarter to 160 in the fourth quarter be-
cause the probability to be sanctioned increases with uninterrupted UB II receipt and 
calendar months in 2005; the number of potential controls decreases with uninter-
rupted UB II receipt from 9,036 to 3,336.  
I consider the predictive power of the regressors in my propensity score estimations 
as rather low.37 It might be that sanction probabilities are influenced by individual 
                                                
37  The pseudo R² varies between 0.05 and 0.12; the probabilities of the likelihood-ratio test 
of the joint insignificance of all the regressors are zero for all estimations (see Table 10 
below and Appendix Table A 2). The area under the ROC curve is on average 77 per-
cent.  
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factors the case managers do observe but that are not reflected in benefit duration, 
nor in my chosen variables for demographic, household and employment history 
characteristics; recent drug problems for instance. If these factors additionally affect 
the reservation wage in a systematic way, my methodological approach fails to 
measure the real effects of sanctions. On the other side, the comparatively low pre-
dictive power of the propensity score estimations and the lack of common support 
problems can, alternatively, be a sign that my assumption of a rather unsystematic 
process of sanctioning is right, since the regressors prove to predict reservation 
wage quite well and showed significant impact in previous research on sanctions.38 
The wider standard deviation of propensity scores for the treated strengthens this 
view.  
I defined three radiuses with different maximum absolute distances for the propen-
sity score differences between treated and controls (so-called caliper) since mean 
and variance of the estimated effects might be sensitive to the choice of the radius. 
The propensity scores of the controls must not be further than (1) 1, (2) 0.1 and (3) 
0.01 percentage points from the propensity score of the treated. The smaller the 
radius, where the propensity scores of the potential controls have to be in, the less 
controls are found for the treated, of course, thereby increasing the variance of the 
estimation, but reducing the potential bias resulting from controls being too different 
to compare.  
Since all estimated propensity scores of the treated are within the range of the pro-
pensity scores of the controls, all potential controls in each quarter of UB II receipt 
are on common support. But not for all three radiuses, controls with features suffi-
ciently similar to the treated can be found (see Table 9). By matching within the wid-
est radius (1) (1 percent of the propensity score of the treated), all treated are as-
signed to almost all potential controls. Within the narrower radiuses (especially the 
0.01 percent radius), clearly less controls can be found; hence not all treated can be 
assigned to a match.  
                                                
38  Regressions on the log reservation wage with the variables used in the propensity score 
and dummies for received UB II sanctions explain about 21 percent of the variances in 
reservation wages (see Appendix Table A 3), a good predictive power, considering previ-
ous results (e.g. Bender et al. 2007 with the same dataset). 
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Table 9 
Number of potential and matched treated and controls by quarter and caliper  
(outcome variable: hourly net reservation wage) 
Number of 
potential  
treatment units 
Number of 
potential  
control units 
Number of 
treatment  
units that are 
matched 
Number of 
control  
units that are 
matched 
Caliper (radius) Quarter of uninter-rupted UB II spell 
105 9035 (1) 0.01 
105 8947 (2) 0.001 105 9036 
103 4495 (3) 0.0001 
1 
131 8472 (1) 0.01 
129 7855 (2) 0.001 131 8485 
118 2673 (3) 0.0001 
2 
147 7948 (1) 0.01 
147 7578 (2) 0.001 147 7952 
139 3447 (3) 0.0001 
3 
160 3333 (1) 0.01 
155 2479 (2) 0.001 160 3336 
127 626 (3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching Algorithm: Radius matching with different calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity 
score distance between treated and controls. The difference between the number of sample members in 
the whole sample (12,822) and the sum of treated and controls in the four quarters of uninterrupted UB II 
spell results from the fact that only those people are selected as potential treatment units who received 
their first UB II sanction in the respective quarter of uninterrupted UB II receipt; and that only those people 
are selected as potential control units who continuously received UB II at least including the last month of 
the respective quarter of uninterrupted UB II receipt, without being sanctioned during the whole observa-
tion period.  
Source: IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”.  
 
The balancing score property is met in all estimations because the covariate distri-
butions between the treatment and control units are very similar for each value of 
the estimated propensity scores. In the following Table 10, the overall match quality 
is displayed: (1) the standardized bias before and after matching, (2) the pseudo R² 
from the propensity score estimation on all the regressors before matching and after 
matching on the matched samples, and (3) the corresponding p-values of the likeli-
hood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors in the propensity score 
estimation before and after matching. Independently of the radius I used, radius 
matching markedly reduces differences of the sample means of treated and con-
trols.  
There is no best performing radius in all estimations in terms of maximum reduction 
of standardized bias and of pseudo R²’s after matching; the wider radiuses, how-
ever, seem to perform better than the narrowest one. In the Appendix Tables A 4 to 
A 6, you find further details on the specific matching quality for each radius and co-
variate. The p-values of the t-test on no difference in means are over 90 percent in 
most cases, and the absolute bias is profoundly reduced after the matching. Like the 
indicators for general matching quality already imply, after matching with the wider 
radiuses, the covariate distributions are more similar than after matching with the 
narrowest one. The p-values of a test whether all covariates do not determine the 
propensity score reject the hypothesis clearly prior to matching but do not reject af-
ter matching. This holds for all radiuses. 
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Table 10 
Quality indicators for the matching by sample and caliper (outcome variable: hourly 
net reservation wage) 
(1a) Stan-
dardized 
bias before 
matching 
(1b) Stan-
dardized 
bias after 
matching 
(2a) 
Pseudo 
R² before 
matching 
(2b) 
Pseudo 
R² after 
matching
(3a) P-value of 
test on H0: ß if 
all covariates 
are zero (before 
matching) 
(3b) P-value of 
test on H0: ß if 
all covariates 
are zero (after 
matching) 
Caliper  
(radius) 
Quarter 
of unin-
terrupted 
UB II 
spell 
2.328 0.006 (1) 0.01 
2.266 0.004 (2) 0.001 8.574 
2.745 
0.047 
0.009 
0.210 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
1 
1.846 0.007 (1) 0.01 
2.285 0.007 (2) 0.001 16.662 
4.834 
0.120 
0.024 
0.000 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
2 
1.815 0.003 (1) 0.01 
1.036 0.002 (2) 0.001 11.080 
3.262 
0.054 
0.014 
0.001 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
3 
1.225 0.001 (1) 0.01 
2.355 0.008 (2) 0.001 12.759 
4.015 
0.089 
0.040 
0.000 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt. Matching Algorithm: Radius matching 
with different calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity score distance between treated and con-
trols. 
Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”.  
 
In sum, the radius matching with different radiuses for subsequent quarters of unin-
terrupted UB II receipt seems appropriate to estimate the average effect of a sanc-
tion on the reservation wages of the sanctioned (ATT), given that my identifying as-
sumptions hold. I present the results of the estimations for all estimated effects, their 
standard errors and 95 percent confidence intervals in Table 11.  
Table 11 
Estimation results of the effect of sanctions on the reservation wages of sanctioned 
unemployment benefit II recipients (ATT)  
Average treatment 
effect on the treated 
(ATT) in Euro 
Standard error of 
ATT in Euro 
95% lower con-
fidence band of 
ATT in Euro 
95% upper con-
fidence band of 
ATT in Euro 
Caliper (radius) 
Quarter of 
uninterrupted 
UB II spell 
0.089 0.241 -0.383 0.561 (1) 0.01 
0.085 0.243 -0.391 0.561 (2) 0.001 
0.095 0.252 -0.398 0.588 (3) 0.0001 
1 
0.222 0.192 -0.155 0.599 (1) 0.01 
0.199 0.197 -0.188 0.585 (2) 0.001 
0.290 0.221 -0.143 0.722 (3) 0.0001 
2 
0.194 0.170 -0.139 0.527 (1) 0.01 
0.222 0.172 -0.115 0.560 (2) 0.001 
0.226 0.181 -0.129 0.582 (3) 0.0001 
3 
-0.032 0.182 -0.389 0.325 (1) 0.01 
0.045 0.192 -0.333 0.422 (2) 0.001 
-0.088 0.233 -0.544 0.369 (3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt: Radius matching with different 
calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity score distance between treated and controls. The 
outcome variable is the net hourly reservation wage in Euro at the time of the interview. The treatment 
is having received a UB II sanction in the respective quarter of uninterrupted UB II receipt vs. having 
continuously received UB II in the respective quarter and not having received a UB II sanction in the 
observation period of one year. 
Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”. 
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The main result shown in Table 11 is that I did not find any significant effect of sanc-
tions on the reservation wages of sanctioned unemployment benefit II recipients. 
This result holds regardless of the specification I chose and the specific quarter of 
UB II receipt I analyzed. Consider for example the first quarter of uninterrupted UB II 
receipt in Table 11: sanctioned UB II recipients have on average slightly higher res-
ervation wages (around nine Eurocents, depending on the radius chosen). The 95% 
confidence interval, however, ranges from around -0.4 Euro to around +0.6 Euro, 
i.e. the confidence intervals include zero independently of the radius chosen. Hence, 
the estimated effect of a sanction on the reservation wage of an UB II recipient 
sanctioned in the first quarter of her UB II spell is not significant.  
This is also the case in the other three quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt. If the 
sanction is received in the second and third quarter, the mean reservation wage of 
sanctioned UB II recipients is around 0.2 to 0.3 Euro higher, and in the fourth quar-
ter quite the same, as the reservation wage of non-sanctioned UB II recipients. All 
confidence intervals of the estimated treatment effects on the treated include zero. 
UB II sanctions do not seem to change the reservation wages of sanctioned UB II 
recipients in a significant way. 
The fact that it is not possible to observe reservation wages in the data before and 
immediately after a sanction limits my analysis: Sanctioned sample members could 
have lowered their reservation wage immediately after a sanction. As a result of 
lower reservation wages due to the sanction, they could have accepted employment 
and, due to being employed, raised their reservation wage again. They would end 
up with a reservation wage higher or equal than the non-sanctioned group, thus 
leading to biased estimation results. In order to confront this limitation, I estimated 
the effect of sanctions on the probability to be employed at the time of the interview 
on sanctioned UB II recipients with the same methodological approach as described 
in the Section Methodology. Thus, the question can be answered if UB II recipients 
who received a sanction at a given period of their UB II receipt have a higher prob-
ability to be employed at the time of their interview in comparison to those who con-
tinue receiving benefits in this period the sanction takes place (and never were 
sanctioned in the observed year).39 
                                                
39  The outcome variable “employed” is 1 if the person reported to be regular employed, self-
employed, employed in a Personal Service Agency or minor employed subject to social 
insurance contributions at the time of the interview, and not to be unemployed and/or in 
labor market measures at the same time; the outcome variable “employed” is 0 if the per-
son is at the time of the interview not employed, employed in a job creating measure, a 
job try-out or internship, in subsidized self-employment or minor employed but not subject 
to social insurance contributions, or at the same time unemployed and/or in labor market 
measures.  
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Table 12 below shows the estimation results of the effect of sanctions on the prob-
ability to be employed at the time of the interview on sanctioned UB II recipients.40 
Sanctioned UB II recipients have on average slightly higher probabilities to be em-
ployed at the time of the interview. In the first three quarters of uninterrupted UB II 
receipt, this probability was between one and four percentage points higher, in the 
last quarter it was between one and four percentage points lower. But the estimated 
effects remain insignificant. The 95% confidence intervals include zero independ-
ently of the quarter and the radius chosen.  
Table 12 
Estimation results of the effect of sanctions on the probability to be employed at the 
time of the interview on sanctioned unemployment benefit II recipients (ATTemp) 
Average treat-
ment effect on the 
treated (ATTemp) 
in percentage 
points/100 
Standard error of 
ATTemp in per-
centage 
points/100 
95% lower con-
fidence band of 
ATTemp in per-
centage 
points/100 
95% upper con-
fidence band of 
ATTemp in per-
centage 
points/100 
Caliper (radius) 
Quarter of 
uninterrupted 
UB II spell 
0.047 0.035 -0.023 0.116 (1) 0.01 
0.037 0.036 -0.033 0.107 (2) 0.001 
0.042 0.038 -0.032 0.115 (3) 0.0001 
1 
0.024 0.031 -0.037 0.085 (1) 0.01 
0.026 0.031 -0.036 0.087 (2) 0.001 
0.015 0.034 -0.052 0.082 (3) 0.0001 
2 
0.024 0.024 -0.023 0.070 (1) 0.01 
0.025 0.024 -0.022 0.072 (2) 0.001 
0.008 0.025 -0.041 0.057 (3) 0.0001 
3 
-0.018 0.020 -0.058 0.021 (1) 0.01 
-0.037 0.020 -0.075 0.002 (2) 0.001 
-0.007 0.021 -0.047 0.033 (3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt: Radius matching with different 
calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity score distance between treated and controls. The 
outcome variable “employed” is 1 if the UB II recipient is employed (regular, self-employed or employed 
at a Personal Service Agency) or minor employed subject to social insurance contributions at the time 
of the interview, otherwise 0. The treatment is having received a UB II sanction in the respective quarter 
of uninterrupted UB II receipt vs. having continuously received UB II in the respective quarter and not 
having received a UB II sanction in the observation period of one year. 
Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”. 
 
These results confirm that there is no statistical prove that UB II sanctions have an 
effect on the probability to be employed at the time of their interview. Thus, the main 
estimation results of the effects of sanctions on reservation wages should not be 
biased because of higher reservation wages of employed sample members. Sanc-
tioned UB II recipients are not significantly more often employed at the time of the 
interview. All estimated effects are insignificant. 
                                                
40  In the Appendix Tables A 7 and A 8, the corresponding numbers of potential and 
matched treated and controls and the quality indicators for the matching are shown for 
each sample and caliper. The slightly smaller numbers of treated and controls compared 
to the matching with the outcome variable “net hourly reservation wage” result from the 
fact that the information on the employment status at the time of the interview is missing 
in the absent cases. 
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Further sensitivity checks 
Apart from matching with different radiuses, I conducted several further sensitivity 
analyses. I repeated my estimations using a six and 12-month stratum instead of the 
estimating the effects for four quarters. For the 12-month-stratum, I additionally con-
ducted the estimations separately for each gender and East and West Germany. 
The insignificant effect of sanctions on the reservation wages of sanctioned UB II 
recipients does not change. I also varied the criteria to define the common support, 
and tried different matching algorithms (various specifications of kernel, nearest 
neighbor and stratification matching) to check the robustness of results. All esti-
mated effects stay insignificant. 
7 Conclusions 
I was interested in the effect of sanctions on the reservation wage of sanctioned 
unemployment benefit II recipients because on the one hand, the exact behavioral 
effect of a benefit sanction is still undetermined in an ongoing and vivid research 
debate. On the other hand, benefit sanctions in Germany were markedly tightened 
with the introduction of the new benefit unemployment benefit II (UB II) in 2005, 
codified in Social Code (SC) II. 
Since 2005, sanctions were further tightened twice. UB II recipients can receive 
sanctions for various reasons, above all showing not enough effort to end unem-
ployment and accepting not practically every job or integration measure. It is the 
non-compliant UB II recipient who has to prove important reasons for her non-
compliance to avoid a sanction. Sanctions cut the base benefit of UB II by 30 per-
cent for most non-compliances, for at least three months.  
According to search theory, benefit sanctions should directly reduce reservation 
wages, faster than exits out of benefit receipt can be realized. To explore this hy-
pothesis, I adopted propensity score matching as a “selection on observables“ ap-
proach to estimate the effect of a received benefit sanction on the reservation wages 
of the sanctioned UB II recipients. The data I used was a survey of unemployment 
benefit II recipients with rich and unique information on the first fifteen months after 
the new SC II was implemented.  
In the survey, net hourly reservation wages were collected in various steps, thus I 
expect them to be more reliable than equivalents in other surveys. Even with a slight 
overrepresentation of UB II recipients with relatively high employment chances in 
the sample, employment chances of sample members are clearly below average 
relative to the German population. Their average net reservation wage is with 6.06 
Euro/hour positioned in the low wage sector, at the very bottom of the German wage 
distribution. This implies that the sample members would accept almost every wage 
offer since most paid net wages lie above their reservation wages.  
For the identification of the effect, I relied on my informative data and the observa-
tion of a rather unsystematic sanctioning process in the first year of the new SC II 
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which is also reflected in my data, resulting from setting up a new benefit system 
including the necessary institutions that deal with it. Benefit sanctions were imposed 
with increased intensity after the implementation of the SC II, but at a low rate (be-
low three percent per month) and less systematic as intended by the regulations in 
the SC II in terms of duration, intensity and justification given.  
I explicitly considered the timing of the sanction in my design and estimated the ef-
fects for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt in 2005. I defined 
three radiuses with different maximum absolute distances for the propensity score 
differences between treated and controls (caliper) since mean and variance of the 
estimated effects might be sensitive to the choice of the caliper. But as the charac-
teristics of the sanctioned and non-sanctioned UB II recipients were quite similar, 
matching the two groups caused no major problems, independently of the radius 
chosen. The balancing score property is met in all estimations.  
The main result is that I did not find any significant effect of sanctions on the reser-
vation wages of sanctioned unemployment benefit II recipients. This result is robust 
regardless of the specification I chose and of the specific quarter of UB II receipt I 
analyzed. The mean effects were in the first three quarters above zero and in the 
fourth quarter around zero, but all confidence intervals of the estimated treatment 
effects on the treated include zero. UB II sanctions do not change the reservation 
wages of sanctioned UB II recipients in a significant way. Further sensivity checks 
did not change the insignificance of effects. 
My paper has some shortcomings rooting in the dataset I used. First, I did not esti-
mate the whole effect of a sanction on reservation wages, but the ex-post effect. 
Previous research on benefit sanctions indicates that ex-ante, sanctions seem to 
have at least as important behavioral effects as ex-post. Second, since it was not 
possible to observe reservation wages before and immediately after a sanction, I 
could not completely rule out the effect of increased reservation wages because 
people might have taken up employment. Third, though I took heterogeneity be-
tween sanctioned and non-sanctioned into account through research design and 
control variables, I did not model unobserved heterogeneity explicitly: If sanction 
probabilities and reservation wages are systematically influenced by unobserved 
individual factors that are not captured in my estimations, my methodological ap-
proach fails to measure the real effects of sanctions. 
Still, the robustness of results leads me to the conclusion that if benefit sanctions 
increase exit rates out of benefit receipt they might do it because they stimulate ef-
fective job search, and not, because they reduce reservation wages. Since reserva-
tion wages are at the utter bottom of the wage distribution, the level of reservation 
wages seems not to be the main reason that an UB II recipient stays unemployed, 
but the lack of job offers. That sanctioned UB II recipients therefore might not reduce 
their already low reservation wages but instead might search with more intensity and 
maybe more know-how for any job offer seems a plausible conclusion. I did not find 
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statistical prove, however, that UB II sanctions have an effect on the probability to 
be employed at the time of the interview. Thus, we do not know if UB II sanctions 
raise exit rates out of benefit receipt at all. 
If the target population has even less employment chances than my sample, I as-
sume that they do not have higher, but rather lower reservation wages and therefore 
the same result should apply. The result is in line with previous research; it should 
nevertheless be substantiated by further research on the effects of benefit sanc-
tions. Future research should explore panel data to deal with (fixed) unobserved 
heterogeneity and time-varying variables. A new panel study of the IAB started in 
December 2006 with information on benefit sanctions and reservation wages and 
will be available soon. Additionally, social experiments seem to be a promising 
source to estimate the (ex-ante and ex-post) effects of benefit sanctions on search 
behavior and reservation wages and to separate the effect of a UB sanction from 
increased job search assistance. 
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Appendix 
Tables 
Table A 1 
Mean characteristics of all sample members and as a function of treatment statust 
 
Non-
sanctioned 
sample 
members 
Sanctioned 
sample 
members 
All sample 
members 
Demographic and household variables  
Gender=woman 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Married man 0.18 0.15 0.18 
Married woman 0.17 0.16 0.16 
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner) 0.56 0.58 0.56 
Employed partner 0.14 0.15 0.14 
Non-/unemployed partner 0.30 0.26 0.30 
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old) 0.12 0.23 0.12 
25 to 40 years old 0.38 0.41 0.38 
40 to 50 years old 0.29 0.24 0.29 
50 to 58 years old 0.22 0.12 0.21 
More than 2 children in household 2004 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Child under 3 in household 0.08 0.10 0.08 
OECD equivalent net monthly household income (Euro) 12/2004 635.25 618.60 634.34 
Other earners in household 0.21 0.26 0.22 
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview 
language 0.10 0.12 0.10 
German/other nationality, parents or interview language 0.22 0.22 0.22 
German nationality, parents and interview language 0.68 0.66 0.68 
Qualification 
Qualification (reference: low)a 0.27 0.35 0.28 
Middle 0.60 0.56 0.60 
High 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Very high  0.07 0.04 0.07 
Drivers license? 0.68 0.65 0.68 
(very) good German language skills  0.87 0.90 0.87 
Employment historyb  
Employed at 31 December 2004 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Cumulated duration of employment 18.98 20.07 19.04 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of employment 1.11 2.03 1.16 
Cumulated duration of unemployment 30.95 26.38 30.70 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of unemployment 1.79 3.83 1.90 
Cumulated duration of qualification 6.35 8.04 6.44 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of qualification 2.10 4.37 2.23 
Hourly net wage(missing are zero) 0.25 0.41 0.25 
Indicator for missing net wage 0.96 0.93 0.96 
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits) 0.08 0.10 0.08 
Welfare/Sozialhilfe 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Unemployment assistance/Arbeitslosenhilfe 0.52 0.45 0.52 
Unemployment benefit/Arbeitslosengeld 0.23 0.27 0.24 
Integration contract  
Integration contract 0.28 0.33 0.28 
Integration contract*month of integration contract 139.00 171.55 140.77 
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Table A 1 continued 
Mean characteristics of all sample members and as a function of treatment statust 
 
Non-
sanctioned 
sample 
members 
Sanctioned 
sample 
members 
Whole 
sample 
Regional labor market  
Share of service jobs 12/2004 per district 0.64 0.62 0.64 
Ratio of offered jobs to registered unemployed in 2005 per district 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Ratio 1-euro-jobs to stock of registered UB II-unemployed 2005 0.24 0.22 0.24 
Unemployment duration 12/2004 in months per district 15.93 15.52 15.91 
Share long-term unemployed 0.40 0.39 0.40 
Share women unemployed 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Share foreigners unemployed 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Share under 25 y unemployed 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Unemployment rate per district 12/2004 15.58 14.46 15.52 
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, 
Baden-Württemberg) 0.08 0.14 0.09 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Mecklenburg, Hamburg 0.35 0.26 0.35 
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Nieder-
sachsen 0.42 0.42 0.42 
High: Thüringen, Bremen, Bayern 0.14 0.18 0.14 
Living in West Germany 0.55 0.63 0.55 
Notes: t. Treatment is to receive a sanction in the first spell of UB II receipt in 2005 vs. never to receive a sanction 
during the observation period. a. Low qualified means no graduation or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- 
and Realschule and no vocational training, middle qualified means (Fach-)Abitur and no vocational train-
ing, or graduation Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and apprenticeship, highly qualified means (Fach-) 
Abitur and apprenticeship or master craftsmen and very highly qualified means university degree. b. in 
months between 1 Jan 2000 and 31 Dec 2004. c. Average sanction rates were 4.1% for the low group, 
5.5% for the middle group, 6.9% for the high group and 8.9% for the very high group.  
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
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Table A 2 
Estimation results of the probit specification of the probability to receive a sanction 
(the propensity score) for all four quarters of permanent UB II receipt 
 
Quarter 1: 
Month 1 to 3 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 2: 
Month 4 to 6 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 3: 
Month 7 to 9 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 4: 
Month 10 to 
12 of per-
manent UB 
II receipt 
Demographic and household variables     
Gender=woman -0.042 -0.173* 0.087 0.098 
Married man 0.022 0.018 0.107 -0.293* 
Married woman 0.133 0.292* 0.058 -0.232 
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner)   
Employed partner -0.023 0.142 0.072 -0.216 
Non-/unemployed partner -0.017 -0.030 -0.027 -0.129 
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old)   
25 to 40 years old -0.356 -0.705*** -0.057 -0.077 
40 to 50 years old -0.428 -0.781*** -0.150 -0.312 
50 to 58 years old -0.635** -1.120*** -0.339 -0.589** 
More than 2 children in household 2004 0.028 0.204 -0.093 -0.041 
Child under 3 in household -0.328* -0.061 -0.054 -0.025 
OECD equivalent net monthly household income 
12/2004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other earners in household 0.011 0.220* 0.105 0.237 
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview language 
German/other nationality, parents or interview lan-
guage -0.078 0.014 -0.055 0.237 
German nationality, parents and interview language -0.117 0.005 -0.070 0.363** 
Qualification         
Qualification (reference: low)a   
Middle -0.084 0.161* -0.151* -0.309*** 
High 0.207 0.061 -0.032 -0.276 
Very high -0.330 0.050 -0.097 -0.379* 
Driving license? -0.008 0.084 -0.077 -0.063 
(Very) good speaking skills in German 0.342** -0.113 0.234* 0.020 
Employment history       
Employed at 31 December 2004 -0.013 -0.080 -0.053 -0.325 
Cumulated duration of employmentb 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.007*** 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of employment -0.017 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 
Cumulated duration of unemployment 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of unemployment -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.008 
Cumulated duration of qualification 0.006 -0.008 -0.002 0.006 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of qualification -0.003 0.000 0.009 0.010 
Hourly net wage(missing are zero) 0.013 -0.051 -0.058 -0.054 
Indicator for missing net wage 0.009 -0.549 -0.565 -0.945 
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits)  
Social assistance/Sozialhilfe -0.003 -0.085 0.150 -0.109 
Unemployment assistance/Arbeitslosenhilfe 0.035 0.030 0.078 0.028 
Unemployment benefit/Arbeitslosengeld 0.306* 0.030 0.097 -0.045 
Integration contract       
Integration contract -0.114 -1.726 -0.405 -0.037 
Integration contract*month of integration contract 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 
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Table A 2 continued 
Estimation results of the probit specification of the probability to receive a sanction 
(the propensity score) for all four quarters of permanent UB II receipt 
 
Quarter 1: 
Month 1 to 3 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 2: 
Month 4 to 6 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 3: 
Month 7 to 9 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 4: 
Month 10 to 
12 of per-
manent UB 
II receipt 
Regional labor market       
Share of service jobs 12/2004 per district 0.052 -1.210** -0.755 -1.475** 
Ratio of offered jobs to registered unemployed in 
2005 per district 0.068 -2.527* -0.323 0.813 
Ratio 1-euro-jobs/stock of UB II-unemployed 2005 0.022 -0.589 -0.202 0.221 
Unemployment duration 12/2004 in months per 
district 0.007 0.158*** -0.031 -0.008 
Share long-term unemployed 0.259 -8.124*** 2.605 -1.646 
Share women unemployed 0.572 -0.716 1.599 -1.487 
Share foreigners unemployed 0.012 -1.038 -0.431 0.419 
Share under 25 y unemployed -0.584 -2.495 -0.280 -4.933* 
Unemployment rate per district 12/2004 -0.003 -0.026 0.006 0.020 
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemberg) 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schles-
wig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Hamburg -0.155 -0.490*** -0.347** -0.085 
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Hessen, Niedersachsen -0.094 -0.475*** -0.342** -0.003 
High: Thüringen, Bremen, Bayern -0.025 -0.173 -0.183 0.066 
Living in West Germany -0.059 -0.357* 0.368** -0.011 
Constant -2.449* 2.366* -2.289* 1.765 
          
N whole estimation sample 9141 8616 8099 3496 
N potential controls 9036 8485 7952 3336 
N potential treated 105 131 147 160 
Log likelihood -547 -597 -695 -592 
Chi2 53 163 80 116 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.09 
Notes: Positive coefficients denote that the respective variable contributes positively to the probability to receive 
a first sanction within the quarter of permanent UB II receipt listed on top of each column. Therefore, the 
coefficients are estimated for four different samples. (*) significance on the 10 percent, (**) 5 percent, 
and (***) 1 percent level. a. Low qualified means no graduation or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- and 
Realschule and no vocational training, middle qualified means (Fach-)Abitur and no vocational training, 
or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and apprenticeship, highly qualified means (Fach-) 
Abitur and apprenticeship or master craftsmen and very highly qualified means university degree. b. in 
months between January1, 2000 and December 31, 2004. 
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
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Table A 3 
Estimation results of the OLS regression of the log reservation wage for all four 
quarters of permanent UB II receipt 
 
Quarter 1: 
Month 1 to 3 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 2: 
Month 4 to 6 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 3: 
Month 7 to 9 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 4: 
Month 10 to 
12 of per-
manent UB 
II receipt 
Demographic and household variables     
Gender=woman -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 
Married man 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 
Married woman -0.019 -0.014 -0.017 0.002 
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner)   
Employed partner -0.014 -0.010 -0.015 -0.017 
Non-/unemployed partner 0.009 0.011 0.011 -0.012 
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old)   
25 to 40 years old 0.264*** 0.276*** 0.237*** 0.277*** 
40 to 50 years old 0.275*** 0.289*** 0.246*** 0.283*** 
50 to 58 years old 0.255*** 0.268*** 0.225*** 0.290*** 
More than 2 children in household 2004 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 
Child under 3 in household 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.091*** 
OECD equivalent net monthly household income 
12/2004 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other earners in household -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.039 
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview language 
German/other nationality, parents or interview  
language -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.044*** -0.042** 
German nationality, parents and interview language -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.085*** 
Qualification         
Qualification (reference: low)a   
Middle 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.019 
High  0.081*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 
Very high  0.186*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 0.162*** 
Driving license? 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
(very) good language skills in German 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.010 
Employment history       
Employment status (reference: unemployed 2004 
and 2005)     
Employed at 31 dec~2004 0.079** 0.072** 0.076** 0.014 
Became employed 2004 to 2005 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.040 
Cumulated duration of employmentb 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of employment 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004** 
Cumulated duration of unemployment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of unemployment 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Cumulated duration of qualification 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 
Under 25*Cumulated duration of qualification 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
Hourly net wage(missing are zero) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.011** 
Indicator for missing net wage 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.162*** 0.031 
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits)  
Social assistance/Sozialhilfe 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.031 
Unemployment assistance/Arbeitslosenhilfe -0.025* -0.021 -0.011 0.021 
Unemployment benefit/Arbeitslosengeld -0.021 -0.017 -0.009 0.007 
Integration contract       
Integration contract -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.052** 
Integration contract*month of integration contract 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table A 3 continued 
Estimation results of the OLS regression of the log reservation wage for all four 
quarters of permanent UB II receipt 
 
Quarter 1: 
Month 1 to 3 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 2: 
Month 4 to 6 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 3: 
Month 7 to 9 
of permanent 
UB II receipt 
Quarter 4: 
Month 10 to 
12 of per-
manent UB 
II receipt 
Regional labor market       
Share of service jobs 12/2004 per district 0.039 0.030 0.044 0.020 
Ratio of offered jobs to registered unemployed in 
2005 per district 0.091 0.134 0.164 0.263 
Ratio 1-euro-jobs/stock of UB II-unemployed 2005 0.012 0.005 0.032 -0.009 
Unemployment duration 12/2004 in months per 
district 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Share long-term unemployed 0.082 0.014 0.037 -0.046 
Share women unemployed -0.420*** -0.451*** -0.432*** -0.335 
Share foreigners unemployed 0.383*** 0.373*** 0.387*** 0.338*** 
Share under 25 y unemployed -0.195 -0.288 -0.266 -0.605* 
Unemployment rate per district 12/2004 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005* 
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemberg) 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen-Anhalt,  
Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Hamburg 0.035** 0.039** 0.042** 0.031 
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Hessen, Niedersachsen -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.008 
High: Thüringen, Bremen, Bayern -0.001 0.002 0.007 -0.007 
Living in West Germany 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.064*** 0.060** 
Received sanction in quarter 1 -0.004    
Received sanction in quarter 2  0.048*   
Received sanction in quarter 3   0.036  
Received sanction in quarter 4    -0.008 
Constant 1.471*** 1.491*** 1.463*** 1.625*** 
          
N whole estimation sample 9141 8616 8099 3496 
N potential controls 9036 8485 7952 3336 
N potential treated 105 131 147 160 
Log likelihood -2000 -1885 -1733 -737 
R2 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.218 
Notes: Interpretation of the estimated coefficients: An additional unit of the respective variables is estimated to 
raise the actual reservation wage by a factor of exp(coefficient) (rule of thumb: coefficient*100=change 
of actual reservation wage in %). (*) significance on the 10 percent, (**) 5 percent, and (***) 1 percent 
level. a. Low qualified means no graduation or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and no 
vocational training, middle qualified means (Fach-)Abitur and no vocational training, or graduation from 
Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and apprenticeship, highly qualified means (Fach-)Abitur and appren-
ticeship or master craftsmen and very highly qualified means university degree. b. in months between 
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2004. 
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005".  
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Table A 4 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.01 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Demographic and household variables  
Gender=woman 0.937 66.6 0.929 76.4 0.885 87.3 0.907 91.4
Married man 0.986 91.4 0.818 61.4 0.85 79.1 0.983 99.1
Married woman 0.918 46.9 0.878 76.1 0.957 11 0.852 68.6
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner) 
Employed partner 0.961 -446.3 0.976 87.5 0.833 73.1 0.945 89.9
Non-/unemployed partner 0.976 68 0.967 94.4 0.885 -257.7 0.94 81
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old) 
25 to 40 years old 0.82 60.8 0.83 47.4 0.913 86.7 0.96 96.9
40 to 50 years old 0.905 43.6 0.984 97.7 0.932 87.2 0.94 94.6
50 to 58 years old 0.508 71.8 0.624 88.9 0.659 85.7 0.91 97.7
More than 2 children in 
household 2004 0.996 94.1 0.986 98.3 0.998 81.4 0.912 48.9
Child under 3 in household 0.713 70.2 0.792 61.7 0.868 59.1 0.982 96
OECD equivalent net monthly 
household income 12/2004 0.798 26 0.917 83.5 0.852 66.7 0.975 91.8
Other earners in household 0.936 83.2 0.969 98.2 0.957 92.1 0.946 94.6
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview language 
German/other nationality, 
parents or interview language 0.867 -23.7 0.889 64.2 0.963 63.6 0.881 79.2
German nationality, parents 
and interview language 0.871 -1511.5 0.873 67.7 0.999 96.8 0.911 94.1
Qualification 
Qualification (reference: low)a       
Middle 0.981 94.6 0.983 97.6 0.801 82.8 0.931 94.7
High  0.885 86.8 0.871 70.3 0.982 82.4 0.873 61.2
Very high  0.614 69 0.945 94.6 0.886 81.6 0.976 98.3
Driver’s license? 0.696 84.3 0.934 91.4 0.933 82.2 0.998 99.7
(Very) good speaking skills in 
German 0.51 66.3 0.822 48.3 0.726 75.6 0.89 92.6
Employment history 
Employed at 31 December 
2004 0.902 49.5 0.936 92.2 0.958 92.2 0.962 96.5
Cumulated duration of em-
ploymentb 0.773 42.5 0.981 97.8 0.98 86.5 0.985 98.4
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of employment 0.983 83.3 0.742 85.2 0.986 97.8 0.876 87.2
Cumulated duration of unem-
ployment 0.784 81 0.603 84.6 0.75 83.4 0.864 93.6
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of unemployment 0.897 87.4 0.996 99.8 0.797 84.9 0.888 93.5
Cumulated duration of qualifi-
cation 0.837 87.2 0.991 98.7 0.939 93.7 0.998 99.9
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of qualification 0.86 88.3 0.863 92.6 0.82 88.2 0.854 92.8
Hourly net wage(missing are 
zero) 0.933 73.1 0.992 98.8 0.996 98.9 0.945 94.1
Indicator for missing net wage 0.923 62.8 0.933 92.5 0.959 93.6 0.958 96.6
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits) 
Social assistance/Sozialhilfe 0.852 79.8 0.999 99.1 0.778 76.1 0.927 -70.2
Unemployment assistance/ 
Arbeitslosenhilfe 0.796 85.2 0.837 87.1 0.787 80.9 0.829 80.1
Unemployment benefit/  
Arbeitslosengeld 0.696 84.3 0.934 91.4 0.933 82.2 0.998 99.7
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Table A 4 continued 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.01 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Integration contract 
Integration contract 0.815 67.4 0.883 -98.9 0.787 83.1 0.855 74.2
Integration contract*month of 
integration contract 0.843 70.2 0.81 50.6 0.745 82.9 0.863 79.3
Regional labor market  
Share of service jobs 12/2004 
per district 0.936 75.4 0.745 91.2 0.683 83.6 0.939 94.7
Ratio of offered jobs to regis-
tered unemployed in 2005 per 
district 0.965 -25.4 0.887 -124.9 0.895 82 0.974 95.5
Ratio 1-euro-jobs/stock of UB 
II-unemployed 2005 0.845 37.3 0.86 80.5 0.913 87.3 0.774 -157.7
Unemployment duration 
12/2004 in months per district 0.893 60.6 0.937 96.4 0.931 79.7 0.892 85
Share long-term unemployed 0.906 62.2 0.854 93.2 0.961 89.8 0.864 82.9
Share women unemployed 0.862 64.7 0.861 85.8 0.893 87.4 0.908 44.1
Share foreigners unemployed 0.909 32.4 0.959 96.3 0.969 6.9 0.911 -63
Share under 25 y unem-
ployed 0.989 48.4 0.771 90.1 0.877 80.1 0.9 -2316
Unemployment rate per 
district 12/2004 0.93 45.9 0.791 87.7 0.929 90.7 0.874 76.8
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Würtemberg) 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein, Mecklenburg,  
Hamburg 0.905 80.2 0.773 88.5 0.704 79.9 0.936 91.9
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  
Hessen, Niedersachsen 0.953 -7876.5 0.996 99.6 0.99 96.6 0.933 48.5
High: Thüringen, Bremen, 
Bayern 0.911 76.4 0.933 95.9 0.848 81.7 0.797 75.1
Living in West Germany 0.859 30.1 0.81 74.7 0.814 84.2 0.882 75.5
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Note: Radius Matching with Caliper 0.01 
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Table A 5 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.001 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Demographic and household variables  
Gender=woman 0.952 74.6 0.855 51 0.838 82.2 0.817 82.7
Married man 0.916 47.6 0.86 70.1 0.991 98.8 0.726 85.7
Married woman 0.907 38.6 0.925 85.4 0.898 -109.7 0.806 57.3
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner) 
Employed partner 0.961 -446.3 0.976 87.5 0.833 73.1 0.945 89.9
Non-/unemployed partner 0.976 68 0.967 94.4 0.885 -257.7 0.94 81
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old) 
25 to 40 years old 0.896 77.5 0.781 31.2 0.879 81.6 0.922 93.7
40 to 50 years old 0.773 -35.1 0.927 89.2 0.921 85.2 0.932 93.7
50 to 58 years old 0.879 93.8 0.889 97 0.914 96.6 0.954 98.8
More than 2 children in 
household 2004 0.92 -4.6 0.906 88.5 0.988 -6 0.871 21.6
Child under 3 in household 0.876 87.8 0.884 79 0.924 76.5 0.929 84.4
OECD equivalent net monthly 
household income 12/2004 0.776 17 0.897 79.6 0.886 74.7 0.912 69.8
Other earners in household 0.942 84.8 0.768 86.5 0.849 72.5 0.705 68.7
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview language 
German/other nationality, 
parents or interview language 0.727 -160 0.987 95.8 0.95 50.1 0.689 42.3
German nationality, parents 
and interview language 0.784 -2626.3 0.924 80.4 0.943 -22.6 0.745 82.3
Qualification 
Qualification (reference: low)a       
Middle 0.793 39.6 0.911 87.2 0.928 93.8 0.934 94.9
High  0.89 87.1 0.981 95.7 0.927 29.7 0.757 24
Very high  0.842 86.3 0.849 85.4 0.946 91.4 0.876 91.2
Driver’s license? 0.887 71.7 0.697 58.5 0.975 93.3 0.972 93.8
(Very) good speaking skills in 
German 0.557 63.9 0.869 62.3 0.936 94.6 0.885 92.1
Employment history 
Employed at 31 December 
2004 0.796 82.4 0.798 75.2 0.87 75.5 0.777 80.2
Cumulated duration of em-
ploymentb 0.501 37.9 0.926 91.4 0.999 99.5 0.94 93.6
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of employment 0.244 -2.2 0.439 66.2 0.857 77.8 0.883 87.2
Cumulated duration of unem-
ployment 0.549 74.6 0.997 99.9 0.991 99.4 0.891 94.8
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of unemployment 0.959 97.7 0.655 82.8 0.953 96.5 0.982 99
Cumulated duration of qualifi-
cation 0.925 95.3 0.872 79.9 0.825 81.6 0.79 87
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of qualification 0.585 83.1 0.874 92.8 0.92 94.6 0.512 75.8
Hourly net wage(missing are 
zero) 0.974 97.3 0.802 70.5 0.913 76.5 0.898 89
Indicator for missing net wage 0.836 87.6 0.765 73.7 0.855 76.7 0.771 81.8
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Table A 5 continued 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.001 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits) 
Social assistance/Sozialhilfe 0.455 -1421.9 0.861 -18.8 0.992 99.1 0.8 -379.2
Unemployment assis-
tance/Arbeitslosenhilfe 0.502 30.1 0.889 91.2 0.989 99 0.762 71.6
Unemployment bene-
fit/Arbeitslosengeld 0.887 71.7 0.697 58.5 0.975 93.3 0.972 93.8
Integration contract 
Integration contract 0.877 75.5 0.864 -134.9 0.987 99 0.917 85.1
Integration contract*month of 
integration contract 0.868 77.6 0.867 65 0.975 98.4 0.949 92.3
Regional labor market  
Share of service jobs 12/2004 
per district 0.934 93.7 0.794 92.8 0.991 99.6 0.924 93.3
Ratio of offered jobs to regis-
tered unemployed in 2005 per 
district 0.887 81.6 0.953 7 0.971 94.9 0.604 24.9
Ratio 1-euro-jobs/stock of UB 
II-unemployed 2005 0.903 -15 0.853 79.7 0.998 99.7 0.925 17.2
Unemployment duration 
12/2004 in months per district 0.794 68.3 0.889 93.7 0.948 84.5 0.85 79.1
Share long-term unemployed 0.845 78.1 0.851 93.1 0.988 96.9 0.81 76.1
Share women unemployed 0.942 61.3 0.864 85.8 0.993 99.1 0.846 4.4
Share foreigners unemployed 0.331 -1475.4 0.852 86.2 0.926 -122.6 0.777 -327.3
Share under 25 y unem-
ployed 0.788 -5997.1 0.81 91.8 0.849 75.5 0.718 -7032.2
Unemployment rate per 
district 12/2004 0.563 6.4 0.845 90.9 0.995 99.4 0.958 92.2
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Würtemberg) 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein, Mecklenburg,  
Hamburg 0.94 91.4 0.999 100 0.976 98.4 0.862 82.1
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  
Hessen, Niedersachsen 0.923 33.2 0.907 90.2 0.875 56.9 0.897 18.6
High: Thüringen, Bremen, 
Bayern 0.822 76.5 0.807 88 0.98 97.7 0.992 99.1
Living in West Germany 0.773 47.4 0.834 77.7 0.957 96.4 0.929 85.1
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Note: Radius Matching with Caliper 0.001 
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Table A 6 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.0001 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Demographic and household variables  
Gender=woman 0.972 84.9 0.532 -75 0.967 96.3 0.934 93.1
Married man 0.975 84.5 0.822 58.6 0.992 98.8 0.586 74.1
Married woman 0.898 32.9 0.906 80.5 0.96 13.3 0.488 -31.9
Partner 2004 (reference: no partner) 
Employed partner 0.979 -196.1 0.757 -37.2 0.925 87.7 0.856 70.6
Non-/unemployed partner 0.904 -27.8 0.645 32.3 0.978 30.4 0.983 94.1
Age 2004 (reference:15 to 25 years old) 
25 to 40 years old 0.807 57.5 0.596 -39.3 0.565 27.9 0.991 99.2
40 to 50 years old 0.646 -117.6 0.749 60.1 0.893 79.1 0.531 47.6
50 to 58 years old 0.82 90.5 0.845 95.4 0.771 90.6 0.979 99.3
More than 2 children in 
household 2004 0.923 3.1 0.862 82.4 0.988 -6.1 0.873 9.9
Child under 3 in household 0.817 81.4 0.264 -69.7 0.721 9.6 0.532 -15.5
OECD equivalent net monthly 
household income 12/2004 0.885 56.3 0.662 29.6 0.989 97.6 0.702 -18.6
Other earners in household 0.86 63.6 0.896 93.9 0.871 75.7 0.703 67.1
Migrant status (reference: other nationality, parents and interview language 
German/other nationality, 
parents or interview language 0.807 -83.9 0.678 -6.4 0.749 -163 0.682 31.5
German nationality, parents 
and interview language 0.7 -3774.7 0.695 19 0.907 -105.9 0.894 91.8
Qualification 
Qualification (reference: low)a       
Middle 0.867 61.2 0.807 71.1 0.891 90.4 0.73 76.3
High  0.962 95.7 0.947 87 0.956 55.9 0.727 -5.6
Very high  0.595 66.6 0.707 69.4 0.809 69 0.842 86.3
Driver’s license? 0.916 95.7 0.994 99.1 0.97 92 0.887 71.7
(Very) good speaking skills in 
German 0.671 78.5 0.716 15.3 0.883 89.4 0.557 63.9
Employment history 
Employed at 31 December 
2004 0.903 49.5 0.681 59.3 0.76 55.8 0.796 82.4
Cumulated duration of em-
ploymentb 0.648 8 0.642 56 0.5 -272.2 0.501 37.9
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of employment 0.994 94 0.408 66.4 0.807 68.5 0.244 -2.2
Cumulated duration of unem-
ployment 0.743 77.3 0.799 92.2 0.992 99.5 0.549 74.6
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of unemployment 0.638 50.4 0.951 97.7 0.636 75.4 0.959 97.7
Cumulated duration of qualifi-
cation 0.611 67.9 0.53 17.8 0.641 63.1 0.925 95.3
Under 25*Cumulated duration 
of qualification 0.541 57.7 0.606 75.9 0.352 56.5 0.585 83.1
Hourly net wage(missing are 
zero) 0.852 20.5 0.663 47.1 0.843 58.4 0.974 97.3
Indicator for missing net wage 0.929 65.1 0.634 57.4 0.699 52.4 0.836 87.6
Benefit receipt 12/2004 (reference: no benefits) 
Social assistance/Sozialhilfe 0.72 61.1 0.876 -10.2 0.605 55.2 0.455 -1421.9
Unemployment assistance/ 
Arbeitslosenhilfe 0.69 77.2 0.937 94.8 0.611 63.1 0.502 30.1
Unemployment benefit/  
Arbeitslosengeld 0.916 95.7 0.994 99.1 0.97 92 0.887 71.7
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Table A 6 continued 
Balancing for each regressor in the propensity score estimation for caliper 0.0001 
Quarter 1  Quarter 2  Quarter 3  Quarter 4  
  
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
P(t-Test 
with H0: 
no differ-
ence in 
means) 
Reduc-
tion of 
absolute 
mean 
bias (in 
%) 
Integration contract 
Integration contract 0.937 88.9 0.708 -440.1 0.723 77.1 0.877 75.5
Integration contract*month of 
integration contract 0.942 89.1 0.708 17.5 0.704 79.4 0.868 77.6
Regional labor market  
Share of service jobs 12/2004 
per district 0.908 64.8 0.703 89.2 0.846 92.1 0.934 93.7
Ratio of offered jobs to regis-
tered unemployed in 2005 per 
district 0.939 -115.6 0.9 -107 0.562 4.3 0.887 81.6
Ratio 1-euro-jobs/stock of UB 
II-unemployed 2005 0.967 86.8 0.934 90.4 0.621 41.7 0.903 -15
Unemployment duration 
12/2004 in months per district 0.996 98.4 0.915 94.9 0.758 25.4 0.794 68.3
Share long-term unemployed 0.977 90.9 0.974 98.8 0.695 15.3 0.845 78.1
Share women unemployed 0.882 69.5 0.813 79 0.927 91.3 0.942 61.3
Share foreigners unemployed 0.784 -63.4 0.42 37.4 0.94 -85.6 0.331 -1475.4
Share under 25 y unem-
ployed 0.905 -357 0.759 89.3 0.66 40.8 0.788 -5997.1
Unemployment rate per 
district 12/2004 0.95 61 0.666 78.7 0.648 51.6 0.563 6.4
Sanction rate in county group (reference: very high: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Würtemberg) 
Low: Brandenburg, Berlin, 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein, Mecklenburg,  
Hamburg 0.89 77 0.513 71.5 0.992 99.5 0.94 91.4
Middle: Sachsen, Saarland, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  
Hessen, Niedersachsen 0.978 -3734.1 0.509 41.5 0.93 75 0.923 33.2
High: Thüringen, Bremen, 
Bayern 0.926 80.6 0.878 92.5 0.873 84.3 0.822 76.5
Living in West Germany 0.846 22.6 0.6 41.2 0.783 81.2 0.773 47.4
Source:  "Life Situation and Social Security 2005". Note: Radius Matching with Caliper 0.0001 
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Table A 7 
Quality indicators for the matching by sample and caliper (outcome variable: prob-
ability to be employed at the time of the interview) 
(1a) Stan-
dardized 
bias before 
matching 
(1b) Stan-
dardized 
bias after 
matching 
(2a) 
Pseudo 
R² before 
matching 
(2b) 
Pseudo 
R² after 
matching 
(3a) P-value 
of test on 
H0: ß if all 
covariates 
are zero 
(before 
matching) 
(3b) P-value 
of test on 
H0: ß if all 
covariates 
are zero 
(after match-
ing) 
Caliper (radius) 
Quarter of 
uninter-
rupted UB II 
spell 
2.307 0.006 (1) 0.01 
2.167 0.004 (2) 0.001 8.731 
3.257 
0.047 
0.012 
0.175 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
1 
1.954 0.008 (1) 0.01 
2.879 0.009 (2) 0.001 16.764 
3.395 
0.120 
0.021 
0.000 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
2 
1.797 0.003 (1) 0.01 
1.350 0.003 (2) 0.001 10.750 
2.461 
0.055 
0.011 
0.001 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
3 
1.251 0.0012 (1) 0.01 
3.226 0.0077 (2) 0.001 12.652 
5.375 
0.089 
0.0449 
0.000 1.000 
(3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching for four subsequent quarters of uninterrupted UB II receipt. Matching Algorithm: Radius matching 
with different calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity score distance between treated and con-
trols. 
Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”.  
 
 
Table A 8 
Number of potential and matched treated and controls by quarter and caliper  
(outcome variable: probability to be employed at the time of the interview) 
Number of 
potential 
treatment 
units 
Number of 
potential 
control  
units 
Number of 
treatment 
units that are 
matched 
Number of 
control units 
that are 
matched 
Caliper (radius) Quarter of uninterrupted UB II spell 
105 8975 (1) 0.01 
105 8892 (2) 0.001 105 8976 
103 4377 (3) 0.0001 
1 
129 8420 (1) 0.01 
124 7800 (2) 0.001 129 8433 
109 2512 (3) 0.0001 
2 
147 7911 (1) 0.01 
147 7383 (2) 0.001 147 7913 
139 3514 (3) 0.0001 
3 
159 3320 (1) 0.01 
153 2526 (2) 0.001 159 3324 
129 617 (3) 0.0001 
4 
Notes: Matching Algorithm: Radius matching with different calipers defining the maximum absolute propensity 
score distance between treated and controls. The differences in the numbers of treated and controls 
compared to the matching with the outcome variable “net hourly reservation wage” result from the fact 
that the information on the employment status at the time of the interview is missing in the absent 
cases. 
Source:  IAB-Survey “Life situation and social security 2005”.  
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Figures 
 
Figure A 1 
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 1 
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Note: Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.02. Source:  Life Situation and Social Security 2005 .
Kernel density estimation of the probability to receive a sanction
as a function of treatment status
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 1
 
 
 
 
Figure A 2 
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 2 
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Note: Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.02. Source:  Life Situation and Social Security 2005 .
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Figure A 3 
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 3 
0
5
10
15
ke
rn
el
 d
en
si
ty
-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
pscore
pscore of treated
pscore of control
Note: Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.02. Source:  Life Situation and Social Security 2005 .
Kernel density estimation of the probability to receive a sanction
as a function of treatment status
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 3
 
 
 
 
Figure A 4 
Distribution of the propensity score in quarter 4 
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